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Abstract
This thesis investigates several questions related to the influence of transmission capacities
and generation of renewable energy on the outcomes in the wholesale electricity markets.
The thesis consists of three self-contained essays that contribute to the policy debate. The
analysis of the first essay focuses on a network with strategic firms that can manipulate
power flows to their advantage. Methodologically, this chapter belongs to the research litera-
ture that represents electricity markets as equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints.
In this framework I compare several policies of enhancing competition and demonstrate that
although network expansion can stimulate competition, larger improvements in consumer
surplus and welfare can be achieved with restructuring. The second essay is based on a
similar model, but in a stylized two node network. This approach demonstrates potential
adverse effects (higher prices, lower total consumption, lower consumer surplus) from higher
renewable infeed in a network where a region with high renewable potential is separated
from a region with high load by a limited transmission capacity. I adopt a worst-case
assumption that in each region there is a strategic player exercising its market power. The
third essay studies the substitution between transmission and storage expansion - two
instruments for the integration of expanding renewable energy. Using a myopic storage
heuristic I demonstrate the relatively modest effect of temporal balancing of renewable
power. In contrast, transmission expansion has a significant potential in increasing re-
newable penetration, mitigating curtailment rates, and reducing the minimum conventional
generation power at any hour. If Europe is to pursue the high targets of renewable power
in electricity consumption, the only way to avoid the expansion of cross border lines is
extremely high installed renewable capacities and energy capacities of storage.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation untersucht Fragen, die sich mit dem Einfluss der U¨bertragungska-
pazita¨ten und der Erzeugung erneuerbarer Energien auf dem Strommarkt befassen. Die
Arbeit besteht aus drei eigensta¨ndigen Aufsa¨tze, die fu¨r die politische Debatte einen Beitrag
leisten. Das erste Kapitel konzentriert sich auf ein Netzwerk mit strategischen Unternehmen,
die die Stromflu¨sse zu ihrem Vorteil manipulieren ko¨nnen. Dieses Kapitel geho¨rt zur
Forschungsliteratur, die Stromma¨rkte als Gleichgewichtsprobleme mit Gleichgewichtsein-
schra¨nkungen darstellt. In diesem Rahmen vergleiche ich mehrere Strategien zur Sta¨rkung
des Wettbewerbs und zeige, dass der Netzausbau zwar den Wettbewerb ankurbeln kann, mit
Umstrukturierungen aber gro¨ßere Verbesserungen des Verbraucheru¨berschusses und des
Wohlstands erzielt werden ko¨nnen. Das zweite Kapitel basiert auf einem a¨hnlichen Mod-
ell mit einem einfachen Zwei-Knoten-Netzwerk. Dieser Ansatz zeigt mo¨gliche nachteilige
Auswirkungen (ho¨here Preise, geringerer Gesamtverbrauch, geringerer Konsumentenrente)
einer ho¨heren Einspeisung erneuerbarer Energie in einem Netz, in dem eine Region mit ho-
hem erneuerbaren Potenzial von einer Region mit hoher Last durch eine begrenzte U¨bertra-
gungskapazita¨t getrennt ist. Die Annahme ist, dass es in jeder Region einen strategischen
Akteur gibt, der seine Marktmacht ausu¨bt. Das dritte Kapitel befasst sich mit der Substitu-
tion zwischen U¨bertragungs- und Speicherkapazita¨ten - beides Instrumente zur Integration
von erneuerbarer Energien. Eine Analyse mit einfachen Speicherheuristik zeigt den relativ
bescheidenen Effekt des zeitlichen Ausgleichs. Im Gegensatz dazu birgt die Erweiterung
des U¨bertragungsnetzes ein erhebliches Steigerungspotenzial fu¨r die Nutzung erneuerbarer
Energiequellen, die Verringerung der Ku¨rzungsraten und die Reduzierung der minimalen
konventionellen Stromerzeugung.
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Introduction
The thesis contains three independent essays, dedicated to different aspects of the Euro-
pean electricity market. Chapter 1 is published in Spiridonova (2016), chapter 2 is a joint
work with Franz Hubert.
Recent decades saw a significant transformation of electricity markets in the European
Union. The objectives behind European energy policy, driving those changes, are defined
by the European Commission (2014d) as competitive pricing, environmental sustainability,
and security of energy. The European Commission (2014d) defines a well integrated internal
energy market as a fundamental pre-requisite to achieve those objectives in a cost-effective
way. Although progress has been made towards an integrated internal energy market, full
integration has not yet been achieved (ACER, 2015a).
An integrated internal energy market is impossible to imagine without cross border inter-
connectors, that provide physical infrastructure for the trade. Compared to the generation
capacities of member states, the size of cross border interconnectors is relatively modest.
In its report for 2015, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) states
that there is a “lack of adequate and efficient investment in electricity network infrastruc-
ture” (ACER, 2015a). The European Commission proposed a 15% interconnection target for
2030, defined as import transmission capacity of a country divided by its installed genera-
tion capacity (European Commission, 2018b, 2017b). For most member states this target
should not be a challenge, as they are expected to have interconnection level well above
15 % already in 2020. Yet for some countries, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain and
Poland, the interconnection level, expected in 2020, is less than 15% (European Commis-
sion, 2017a). The size of physical infrastructure is not the only concern - the existing network
is not used efficiently. ACER (2017) estimates that in 2016 out of maximum feasible cross-
zonal capacity on average only 47% was actually available to the market on high voltage
alternating current interconnectors, and 85% on high voltage direct current interconnectors.
The second topic, discussed in this thesis, is the electricity supply from variable renewable
energy sources. Between 2005 and 2016, the share of renewables in generation mix of
EU-28 grew from 14.8% to 29.6% (European Commission, 2018c). This share is expected
to grow further, as the binding final energy consumption target of at least 32% of renew-
able energy translates into more than 49% of renewables in electricity generation (European
1
Commission, 2014c, 2018a; European Union, 2018). Since no substantial growth of hydro
power is expected (Lehner et al., 2005; Becker et al., 2014), the key role in this expan-
sion will be played by such renewable energy sources as wind and solar. This increasing
reliance on renewable energy is aided by the multiple support schemes, employed by mem-
ber states (European Commission, 2013) and by declining levelized costs of wind and solar
power. Fraunhofer ISE (2015) estimates that the costs of solar power will decrease even
under conservative assumptions of no technological breakthroughs. The cost reduction is
also expected for wind power (Wiser et al., 2016; Agora Energiewende, 2017).
The limited transmission capacities between the countries and the expected growth of re-
newable penetration give rise to a wide range of issues. This thesis addresses three of
them. First, are cross border transmission capacities sufficient to ensure a competitive mar-
ket? Chapter 1 demonstrates that the answer to this question is negative if large generating
companies are assumed to be aware of how to manipulate flows in the network to their ad-
vantage. Second, if the trade between regions is restricted by limited transmission capacity,
will a higher level of supply from renewable generators always lead to a more competitive
market outcome? Chapter 2 demonstrates that insufficient transmission capacity, combined
with intermittent supply from renewable generators, may result in a decline of total generation
and consumer surplus in the market. Third, given the expansion of installed renewable ca-
pacities, to what extent can storage substitute network expansion? Chapter 3 demonstrates
that for the realizable potential of pumped storage, the effect of temporal balancing of in-
termittent renewable generation is relatively modest compared to that of spacial balancing.
Analysis in chapters 1-3 can offer additional insights into the functioning of future European
network.
The remainder of this section presents extended abstracts for each chapter.
Chapter 1 studies the potential for market power abuse in an integrated European electricity
market. The integration of national electricity markets into a single European one is expected
to reduce the ability of dominant players to exercise market power. This chapter investigates
whether or not existing transmission capacities of cross border interconnectors are sufficient
to achieve this result and create vigorous competition in the market. A model with two deci-
sion levels is used. On the first level profit maximizing generators play Cournot game against
each other. On the last level the system operator clears the market and determines flows
in the network to maximize social welfare subject to a set of physical constraints. As each
strategic generator anticipates her impact on equilibrium prices and congestion in the sys-
tem, her optimization problem is subject to equilibrium constraints from the system operator’s
problem.
2
The analysis demonstrates that interconnector capacities in Western Europe are insufficient
for integration alone to reduce the exercise of market power. I compare several possible
competition-enhancing policies: expansion of interconnectors and different scenarios of mar-
kets’ restructuring. I show that although an increase of line capacity is a useful tool to stim-
ulate competition in an integrated market, it is not a substitute for the restructuring of large
players.
Chapter 2 is the joint work with Franz Hubert. Here we explore the implications of increasing
renewable supply for the market outcome in transmission constrained network. Many coun-
tries are adding substantial capacities of wind and solar based power generation to their
portfolio in the process of the de-carbonization of the power industry. While ownership of
conventional capacities is typically highly concentrated, renewable energy is often provided
by small, independent producers. Hence, one might expect competitive pressure in the elec-
tric power industry to increase as renewable energy production is ramped up.
However, energy from renewable sources often has to be transported over long distances
and current transmission systems are poorly designed for this task. This is particularly true
for wind power produced in coastal areas. In this chapter we show that with insufficient
transmission capacities, an increase of wind in-feed in the surplus region might lead to a
decline in total generation and consumer surplus in the market. The reason for this somewhat
counter-intuitive effect is a switch from an equilibrium in which the market is fully integrated
to an equilibrium in which transmission constraint is binding. The resulting fragmentation of
the market allows the dominant conventional producers to exploit their local market power
more aggressively.
We use a simple two nodes / one line network model. First we explain the anti-competitive
effect of increased wind in-feed in more detail. Then we calibrate the model with German
data on consumption and transmission and characterize pure and mixed strategy equilibria
for various levels of wind in-feed. We find that for a large range of parameters, wind in-feed
in the northern surplus region has the potential to aggravate market power and decrease
consumer welfare. Finally we discuss measures to mitigate this effect, such as maintaining
enough competition among conventional producers and increasing transmission capacity.
Chapter 3 studies the trade-offs related to the integration of expanding renewable energy.
Decarbonization, envisioned by the European Union, goes hand in hand with an increasing
reliance on such renewable energy sources as wind and solar. Since this energy is inher-
ently intermittent, the future European power systems need to be able to deal with increasing
frequency of mismatch between demand for electricity and power generation. Both transmis-
3
sion and storage can be used to address this issue, as they balance intermittent renewable
output by shifting surplus generation to deficit regions or to deficit times.
While there is an extensive research literature, that looks for an optimal way to integrate
expanding renewable energy, my research focuses on the underlying substitution between
transmission and storage expansion. To investigate it, I implement a myopic storage heuristic
for various combinations of installed renewable capacity and volume of storage in a network
of 19 European countries. I study how certain power system indicators – renewable pene-
tration, curtailment rates, and the minimum conventional back-up – change with (a) installed
renewable capacities, (b) energy capacity of storage, and (c) transmission constraints in the
network. For a storage capacity limited to 2.6 TWh, which is equivalent to the sum of exist-
ing pumped storage capacity and the realizable potential for pumped storage, each indicator
demonstrates a relatively modest effect of temporal balancing. In contrast, transmission ex-
pansion has a significant potential in mitigating curtailment rates, increasing the penetration
of renewable and reducing the need for conventional back-up. These conclusions can offer
additional insights for the future network.
Appendix D provides the technical documentation.
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Chapter 1
Transmission capacities and
competition in Western European
electricity market
Abstract
The integration of national electricity markets into a single European one is expected to
reduce the ability of dominant players to exercise market power. This paper investigates
whether or not existing transmission capacities of cross-border interconnectors are sufficient
to achieve this result and create vigorous competition in the market. A model with two deci-
sion levels is used. On the first level profit maximizing generators play Cournot game against
each other. On the last level the system operator clears the market and determines flows
in the network to maximize social welfare subject to a set of physical constraints. As each
strategic generator anticipates her impact on equilibrium prices and congestion in the sys-
tem, her optimization problem is subject to equilibrium constraints from the system operator’s
problem.
The analysis demonstrates that interconnector capacities in Western Europe are insufficient
for integration alone to reduce the exercise of market power. I compare several possible
competition-enhancing policies: expansion of interconnectors and different scenarios of na-
tional markets’ restructuring. I show that although increase of line capacity is a useful tool
to stimulate competition in an integrated market, it is not a substitute for the restructuring of
large players.
Keywords: electric power market, Stackelberg game, electricity transmission, market power,
network expansion
This chapter is published in Spiridonova, O. (2016). Transmission capacities and competition
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in Western European electricity market. Energy Policy, 96:260 – 273, https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.enpol.2016.06.005
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1.1 Introduction
Energy goals of European Union include affordable and competitive prices, environmental
sustainability and security. An integrated energy market is considered a fundamental pre-
requisite to achieve these objectives in a cost-effective way.1 In its turn, integration heavily
depends on the physical infrastructure used to deliver electric power. The European trans-
mission system, however, was developed in times when regulated regional monopolists dom-
inated the market and cross-border transmission capacities were required only for system
reliability. Therefore the adequacy of existing transmission capacities comes into question.
In this paper I focus on the effect the transmission capacities in the network have on compe-
tition in the market for electric power. It is expected that an integrated market would have a
positive effect on competition. Dozens of generators would compete with each other with no
single firm having a significant market share. Since no single generator would be dominant,
the ability of firms to exercise market power would be curtailed. Currently the threat of mar-
ket power abuse cannot be dismissed, as regional market concentration in Europe remains
high. Out of 28 member countries of European Union, in 2012 in 23 the market share of the
largest generation company was at least 25%, and in nine countries it was above 75%.2 Such
concentration is not likely to disappear any time soon, but it might be mitigated through the
integration of regions into a larger market. Although recent developments towards a common
market in electric power generation yielded some convergence in wholesale prices, substan-
tial differences remain3, pointing at insufficient transmission capacities. If the capacities of
interconnectors are indeed inadequate to allow for vigorous competition, market power of re-
gional dominant players may not be diminished in an integrated market. This, in turn, would
mean that integration without regulation or without restructuring of large companies may not
produce the desired competitive market outcome.
To analyze the effect the transmission capacities in the network have on competition in the
market for electric power one has to make several modeling assumptions. First, that gener-
ating companies are not price-takers. It’s impossible to study the potential for market power
abuse without considering it. Second, that generating companies take into account the in-
fluence they have on flows and congestion. I discuss the models that employ those two
assumptions in greater detail in the next section. For the purposes of an introduction it is
1See European Commission (2014d).
2See European Commission (2014a) and European Commission (2014b).
3See Zachmann (2008).
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important to note that due to computational difficulties such models were rarely used to ana-
lyze real life power markets with large networks. Therefore this paper, with an analysis of an
aggregated representation of Western European countries’ network, presents a contribution
to the energy policy literature. I show potential drawbacks of an integration combined with a
complete deregulation, and compare the effects of several possible changes in the market
structure that can lead to a more competitive outcome in the integrated market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section provides the literature re-
view. The third section describes the mathematical model, the solution approach employed
to find Nash equilibrium and the data on the Western European market. The fourth section
presents market equilibria in case of oligopoly and, as a benchmark, in case of perfect com-
petition. The analysis shows that existing interconnector capacities are insufficient to reduce
market power of dominant players in an integrated market. The fifth section compares two
possible competition-enhancing policies: an increase of interconnector capacities and an in-
crease in the number of generation companies. The paper concludes with a discussion of
results and their implications for market policy.
1.2 Modeling of electricity markets: literature review
Capacity constraints strengthen market power, as they limit the ability of outside competitors
to enter the market. The importance of transmission capacities for competitions in coupled
markets has been highlighted in a seminal paper of Borenstein et al. (2000). With insuffi-
cient line capacity a strategic generator may find it profitable to restrict her output. This will
congest the line into her area of dominance and allow her to exploit market power over the
residual demand. But not only a restriction in output can be a profitable way to avoid com-
petition. Cardell et al. (1997) show that a strategic generator can increase her production to
congest the line from her area of dominance, prevent competitors from entering her market
and therefore be free to exercise market power. As pointed out by Cardell et al. (1997) for a
three node example in such a case the total generation in the market will be less compared
to the foreclosed competitive outcome.4 With sufficiently large lines such strategies of con-
gesting lines to avoid competition may no longer be a part of equilibrium. Cardell et al. (1997)
emphasize the need for market analysis with realistic models as the profitability of a congest-
ing strategy depends on the exact properties of the network. In general, a sufficiently large
4A similar two node result can be found in the appendix of Borenstein et al. (2000), with the examples of
asymmetric market equilibria.
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increase of transmission capacity merges nodes into one market and strengthens competi-
tion between previously monopolistic players. Moreover, one does not necessarily need a lot
of transmission capacity to increase competition. As Borenstein et al. (2000) demonstrate,
even a relatively small line has a potential to induce Cournot equilibrium between two former
monopolists. Surprisingly, this effect does not depend on how much power will actually flow
via the line.
In the above mentioned examples profit-maximizing firms take their impact on network op-
eration into account. Another numerical approach to model strategic firms in constrained
networks is to assume that generating firms can’t correctly anticipate the effect of their out-
put on flows and congestion. Such models are sometimes referred as portraying “naive”
generators and are used, for example, in Hobbs (2001) and Tanaka (2009). Compared to
models with “non-naive” generators they have an advantage of being formulated as mixed
complementarity problems with unique solutions. This significantly simplifies calculations for
large networks. A disadvantage of such approach is that it can produce lower price estimates
as shown in Neuhoff et al. (2005), thus leading to overly optimistic conclusions. Therefore I
assume in this paper that generating companies understand how to manipulate congestion,
as, for example in Borenstein et al. (2000).
A power market with strategic generators that can correctly anticipate the effect of their output
on flows and congestion and use this knowledge to their advantage can be represented as a
two-level game. In terms of timing, first action is taken by strategic generators, who choose
their level of output to maximize their profits. Next the system operator maximizes social wel-
fare subject to a set of physical constraints while taking generators’ output as given. As each
strategic generator correctly anticipates how her choices will influence equilibrium prices and
congestion in the system, her optimization problem is subject to equilibrium constraints from
the system operator’s problem. That is strategic generator’s problem of profit maximization
includes in itself first order necessary optimality conditions from the system operator’s prob-
lem as a part of the constraints set. This type of problem, solved by each strategic generator,
is known as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).5 As there are sev-
eral strategic producers on the market, finding an equilibrium requires solving a system of
MPECs, or an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC).
Examples of two-level modeling of energy markets can be found, among others, in Cardell
et al. (1997), Cunningham et al. (2002), Hu et al. (2004), Ehrenmann (2004), Ralph and
Smeers (2006) and Hu and Ralph (2007). As MPECs are, in general, non-convex6, an EPEC
5For a comparison with other approaches in modeling electricity markets see Ventosa et al. (2005).
6See, for example, Gabriel et al. (2013) and Hu and Ralph (2007).
9
might have many or none pure strategy Nash equilibria. Borenstein et al. (2000) demonstrate
this problem in the simplest two node network. A number of papers, for example, Fortuny-
Amat and McCarl (1981), Gabriel and Leuthold (2010),Ruiz et al. (2012) and Siddiqui and
Gabriel (2013) address the challenges of solving an MPEC. As a result of those computa-
tional difficulties the two-level approach was rarely used to analyze real life power markets
with large networks. For example, Ehrenmann and Neuhoff (2009) and Neuhoff et al. (2005)
both use EPECs to analyze the power markets of Northwestern Europe. Ehrenmann and
Neuhoff (2009) compare outcome under market coupling and under a coordinated auction
of interconnectors, and conclude that market coupling performs better. They point out an
important issue: market coupling can produce ambiguous incentives. On the one hand, it
can reduce the ability of generators to exercise market power by importing demand elastic-
ity. On the other hand, if companies own generating capacities at several nodes, integration
can provide an incentive to increase the exercise of market power. Ehrenmann and Neuhoff
(2009) state the balance of those effects can not be determined analytically and needs to
be estimated on a real life data. This conclusion stresses the importance of computational
analysis for policy estimation.
This paper applies two-level model to an aggregated representation of Western European
countries’ network. I show potential drawbacks of a complete deregulation and compare the
effects of several possible changes in the market structure that can lead to a more competitive
outcome in the integrated market. This analysis constitutes the contributions of this paper.
The paper builds on the previous work on two-level models. In particular, in terms of solving
each MPEC, I follow the methodology of Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) based on reformulating
MPEC as a mixed-integer linear program. The same data set as in Gabriel and Leuthold
(2010) is used. The key difference is that Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) model power mar-
ket of Western Europe as a monopolistic one with just one strategical generating company
and the rest behaving as competitive fringe. Although this approach offers some important
benchmark results, such market structure assumption may be not very realistic. This paper
assumes that Western European power market is oligopolistic with several large generating
companies acting strategically.
1.3 Model
As stated in the previous section, interactions in electricity market are represented by a two-
level model. First, strategic generators play a Nash-Cournot game against each other and
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choose their level of output to maximize their profits. Second, the system operator clears the
market. It takes generators’ output as given and maximizes social welfare subject to a set of
physical constraints. The system operator determines flows in the network, load, competitive
dispatch and sets the nodal prices. As each strategic generator knows that her choices can
influence equilibrium prices and congestion in the system, her profit optimization problem is
subject to equilibrium constraints from the system operator’s problem. Due to the fact that
strategic generators take the flow feasibility constraints into account, if a solution for EPEC
exists, it has to be feasible. Congested line in the equilibrium is just a line that is scheduled
for use up to its maximum capacity, but not above it. Thus there is no need for redispatch in
the model.7
To capture loop flows in the network I employ widely applied DC load flow approximation with
no losses from Schweppe et al. (1988). The mathematical formulation of the model further is
taken from Gabriel and Leuthold (2010), who consider only one strategic player and solve a
corresponding MPEC. I assume that the number of strategic players is larger than one. That
is, an EPEC is solved to determine the equilibrium in the market.
1.3.1 Mathematical formulation
The notation for the problems is shown below.
Sets:
N set of nodes
L set of links
J set of firms
U set of generating technologies (types of units)
Indices:
n, k nodes in the network
7Note that here it is assumed that all electricity is traded in a spot market. It has been pointed out by one of
the reviewers that a reasonable level of contract cover would massively reduce the incentive to exercise market
power. True, such an effect was predicted in the work of Allaz and Vila (1993). Nethertheless, contract cover
does not undermine the worst-case outlook of this paper, that strives to see how competitive the integrated
market will be even if all regulation fails. From the empirical standpoint, even though one can deduce the amount
of electricity traded not on the spot exchange, prices in mutual agreements are unknown. In terms of size of the
existing contract cover, comparison of data from European Energy Exchange AG for the bidding area of Germany
and Austria with ENTSO-E load data for the same countries tells us that at the end of 2014 in this area about
half of the load was traded on the power exchange, there as for France this number was around 10%.
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n′ swing node
l links in the network
j1 aggregated price-taking firm in the market
j2 to jJ strategic firms in the market
u generating technologies
Parameters:
an, bn demand intersect, demand slope at node n (an, bn ≥ 0 ∀n)
B Network susceptance matrix of size n× n
H Network transfer matrix of size l × n
flowmaxl transmission capacity of line l
cn,u marginal cost of generation at n with unit u (cn,u ≥ 0 ∀n, u)
gmaxn,j,u generation capacity of firm j at node n with unit u
sw swing bus indicating vector of length N , swn′ = 1, swn̸=n′ = 0
Variables:
dn quantity consumed at node n
gn,j,u generation by firm j at node n with unit u
pn nodal price at node n
δk phase angle at node k
The system operator maximizes total welfare, equal to gross surplus minus generation costs,
with respect to a number of constraints.8 First, in each node energy consumed has to be
equal to the sum of generation in that node and net imports from other nodes (1.1b), where
net injection (withdrawal) at node n is equal to
∑︁
k∈N Bnkδk. Second, the flow on each line,
equal to
∑︁
k∈N Hlkδk, is constrained by the transmission capacity (1.1c and 1.1d). Third,
output of each firm is limited by its installed generation capacity (1.1e). And finally (1.1f)
8One should note that in reality there is a difference between social welfare, equal to the sum of seller and
consumer surpluses minus generation costs, and observed surplus as an area between demand and submitted
supply curves. The former is unobserved by the system operator. Here system operator is assumed to know the
true marginal costs of power generation.
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defines a slack bus.
max
δk,dn,gn,j1,u
W =
∑︂
n∈N
⎡⎣(︁an − 12bndn)︁ dn − ∑︂
j∈J,u∈U
cn,ugn,j,u
⎤⎦ (1.1a)
s.t. −
∑︂
j∈J,u∈U
gn,j,u +
∑︂
k∈N
Bnkδk + dn = 0 (pn) ∀n (1.1b)
−flowmaxl +
∑︂
k∈N
Hlkδk ≤ 0 (µl) ∀l (1.1c)
−flowmaxl −
∑︂
k∈N
Hlkδk ≤ 0 (µl) ∀l (1.1d)
gn,j,u − gmaxn,j,u ≤ 0 (βn,j,u) (1.1e)
−swnδn = 0 (γn) (1.1f)
dn ≥ 0 ∀n (1.1g)
gn,j,u ≥ 0 ∀n, j, u (1.1h)
Each strategic generation firm maximizes its profits in Cournot competition subject to its ca-
pacity constraint (1.2b) and to equilibrium constraints from system operator’s problem (1.2c-
2j).
∀j ∈ {j2, J}, max
gn,j,u
Πj (gn,j,u, gn,−j,u) =
∑︂
n∈N
∑︂
u∈U
[pngn,j,u − cn,ugn,j,u] (1.2a)
s.t. gn,j,u − gmaxn,j,u ≤ 0 ∀n, j, u (1.2b)
0 ≤ −an + bndn + pn ⊥ dn ≥ 0, ∀n (1.2c)
0 ≤ cn,j1,u − pn + βn,j1,u ⊥ gn,j1,u ≥ 0, ∀n, j1, u (1.2d)∑︂
n∈N
Bnkpn +
∑︂
l∈L
Hlkµl −
∑︂
l∈L
Hlkµl − sw × γn = 0 δk(free) ∀k
(1.2e)
−
∑︂
j∈J,u∈U
gn,j,u +
∑︂
k∈N
Bnkδk + dn = 0 pn(free) ∀n
(1.2f)
0 ≤ flowmaxl −
∑︂
k∈N
Hlkδk ⊥ µl ≥ 0 ∀l (1.2g)
0 ≤ flowmaxl +
∑︂
k∈N
Hlkδk ⊥ µl ≥ 0 ∀l (1.2h)
0 ≤ −gn,j1,u + gmaxn,j1,u ⊥ βn,j1,u ≥ 0, ∀n, j1, u (1.2i)
−swnδn = 0 (γn) (1.2j)
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The solution for the Nash equilibrium is found by diagonalization, a variant of the Gauss-
Seidel algorithm for numerical solution of simultaneous equations and the most common9
strategy for solving an EPEC. The diagonalization substitutes the task of solving EPEC by a
task of solving a sequence of MPECs until the decision variables of all strategic players reach
a fixed point. In terms of finding a solution for each MPEC, I follow the methodology of Gabriel
and Leuthold (2010) based on reformulating MPEC as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP)
using disjunctive constraints and linearization.
The steps of Gauss-Seidel algorithm are as follows:
1. First, I define a starting point as a set of initial output levels for all generating companies,
a convergence criterion and a maximum number of iterations;
2. For each iteration i j-th strategic generator updates its optimal strategy given the best
responses found at iteration i for strategic generators from 1 to (j − 1) and the best
responses found at iteration i− 1 for strategic generators from (j + 1) to J ;
3. Convergence is reached if for all generating companies the absolute difference be-
tween the best respose generation levels found in iteration i and the ones found in
iteration i− 1 is less or equal to convergence criterion, otherwise the algorithm fails to
converge.
As was mentioned above, the EPEC may not have any pure strategy Nash equilibrium or
may have multiple equilibria. Therefore I use multiple starting points.10,11
1.3.2 Model calibration
The research is carried out on the same data set as in Gabriel and Leuthold (2010). Follow-
ing Gabriel and Leuthold (2010), I refer to the market of several Western European countries,
9See Gabriel et al. (2013), chapter 7.
10The number of starting points studied is equal to 3 to the power of (number of strategic generators - 1). I
consider 3 possible levels at which the output of every strategic firm can be fixed in the starting point. Those
levels are: autonomous monopoly output, output of a monopoly on the residual demand with every line being
congested into the node, output of a monopoly with every line being congested out of the node (optimal passive
and optimal aggressive output in the terminology of Borenstein et al. (2000)). Some of the starting points are
identical due to the restrictions imposed by installed generation capacity.
11Calculations were performed in GAMS using CPLEX solver. As a test the code successfully replicated results
for a simple network with two nodes, one line and two strategic players from Borenstein et al. (2000). Tests for
different scenarios presented in sections 4 and 5 took between 36 minutes and 100 hours on an Intel Xeon CPU
E5-2620 with 16 GB RAM.
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described by the data, as to the Western European one. There are seven country nodes:
Belgium (nodes n3 and n6), France (n2), Germany (n1), and the Netherlands (n4, n5, and
n7). Auxiliary eight nodes have no supply and demand and are used to model different
cross border transmission lines. I consider five generation companies: E.ON (EON), RWE,
Electricite´ de France (EDF), Electrabel (EBEL) and the competitive fringe, aggregated for
convenience into one player j1. Generating capacities are divided into 8 types: nuclear,
lignite, coal, combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), gas, oil, hydro and pump. Installed gener-
ation capacities and information on marginal costs can be found in table 1.1, the map of the
aggregated network in figure 1.1, and the line capacities in table A.1 in the appendix A.1.
As described in section 1.3, there is a linear demand function in the model. For the results
to be comparable with Gabriel and Leuthold (2010), I use the same demand data from the
Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE). The detailed description of
demand methodology can be found in Leuthold et al. (2008). To construct a linear demand
function reference levels for price and demand were obtained by calculating average spot
market price and consumption in 2003, and elasticity of -0.25 was assumed at reference
point. Only one average hour is considered, and all results - price, generation, consumer
surplus, welfare and profits - refer to hourly values.12
12To see how the equilibrium in oligopoly can depend on the assumptions used see Neuhoff et al. (2005),
page 508, figure 6, results labelled “Responsive T allocation”. Neuhoff et al. (2005) use a slightly different
representation of the same Western European market, in particular, they consider 8 strategic players, separate
summer and winter demand scenarios, and linearized marginal costs functions. Compared to results in this
paper, nodal prices in Neuhoff et al. (2005) are approximately the same for Germany, slightly higher for the
Netherlands, about 30% higher for France and about 50-60% higher for Belgium. Seasonal effects are the likely
explanation for the difference in French and Belgian prices - Neuhoff et al. (2005) report prices averaged over
summer scenarios, while demand function in this paper represents just one average hour per a year. Hence
results in this paper do not refer to a peak demand scenario, and potential for market power is not overestimated.
The fact that Neuhoff et al. (2005) consider 8 strategic players does not change results significantly: increasing
number of firms in already competitive Germany has almost no effect, and having a small additional strategic
player in France does not lead to a reduction in French prices.
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Figure 1.1: Network map: links and nodes in Western Europe; based on Gabriel and
Leuthold (2010) and Neuhoff et al. (2005)
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Table 1.1: Generation capacities (GW) and marginal costs per technology (e/MWh) in the
fifteen-node Western European network. Source: Gabriel and Leuthold (2010)
nuclear lignite coal CCGT gas oil hydro pump
marginal costs 10 20 22 30 45 60 0 35
generation capacities of a company in the specified node total
Germany
n1.EON 8 1 7 0 4 3 0 1 24
n1.RWE 6 11 3 2 2 1 0 0 25
n1.j1 6 9 19 6 5 2 1 5 53
France
n2.EDF 58 1 16 0 0 11 14 3 103
Belgium
n3.EBEL 3 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 8
n6.EBEL 3 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 8
Netherlands
n4.EON 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
n4.EBEL 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
n4.j1 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 6
n5.j1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
n7.EBEL 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 4
n7.j1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
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1.4 Equilibrium outcome in Western European market
This section presents equilibria found in the model of an integrated Western European mar-
ket. In order to explore the potential for market power abuse, I assume that four generating
firms - EON, RWE, EDF, EBEL - act strategically when bidding their output. The output of an
aggregated price-taking player is determined by the system operator. An important note con-
cerns EDF. The sheer size of this French company gives it a decisive role in determining the
market outcome. Therefore it is reasonable to consider EDF to be strategic, even thought
it is owned almost completely by French government.13 Such an assessment provides us
with a worst-case outlook, where EDF strives to maximize its profits in the absence, or with
a complete failure of regulation.14 One of the ideas behind the integration is that in a large,
integrated market big national players are forced to compete with each other and the need
for regulation is reduced. Thus the assumption about an absence of regulation is justified.
To identify the two effects - of line capacity and of market structure - on competition, I look at
four scenarios: oligopoly and perfect competition in constrained and unconstrained networks.
Perfect competition results in a constrained network are taken from Gabriel and Leuthold
(2010), perfect competition results in an unconstrained were calculated based on the code
from Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) with transmission constraints ignored in the calculation.
Table 1.2 provides a comparison of nodal generation and nodal prices for these four cases.
Columns titled “constrained” refer to the equilibria found given the existing interconnector
capacities in the Western Europe, while those titled “unconstrained” - to the hypothetical
situation when interconnectors can accommodate any possible flows. Consumer surpluses
and welfare levels are presented in tables A.4 and A.5, firms’ profits - in A.6.
The model assumes that generating companies know that they can manipulate flows and
congestion in the network to their advantage. This leads to non-continuous best response
functions of each company to the output of others, which in turn leads to a possibility for
multiplicity or non-existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In all cases considered I have
always found at least one equilibrium. In some cases different starting points lead to slightly
different equilibria. Due to the insignificant difference between these equilibria a plausible
13EDF used to be a completely state-owned corporation until the end of 2005. As of the end
of 2014, the french government retains 84.5% of shares. See the shareholding structure on the
web page of EDF: https://www.edf.fr/en/the-edf-group/dedicated-sections/finance/financial-information/the-edf-
share/shareholding-structure
14As a benchmark, the last two columns of tables A.2 and A.3 report the market equilibrium for the case when
EDF behaves as a price-taker while EON, RWE, EBEL act strategically when bidding their output.
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Table 1.2: Nodal generation (gen, GW) and nodal prices ( e/MWh) in constrained and un-
constrained network
perfect competition oligopoly
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constrained unconstrained constrained unconstrained
gen price gen price gen price gen price
n1, Germany 62.2 22.0 61.7 22.0 61.3 30.0 71.0 30.0
n2, France 66.0 10.0 73.0 22.0 29.0 76.0 47.0 30.0
n3, Belgium 2.5 10.0 3.0 22.0 4.0 52.0 5.0 30.0
n6, Belgium 3.5 22.0 3.0 22.0 4.0 48.0 4.0 30.0
n4, Netherlands 4.6 45.0 0.1 22.0 4.3 45.0 4.0 30.0
n5, Netherlands 2.0 59.4 0 22.0 2.0 45.6 0 30.0
n7, Netherlands 2.0 41.4 0 22.0 4.0 41.4 1.0 30.0
explanation is that they are a product of discretization of the generation decisions by strategic
players. Once the step of discretization is decreased, those equilibria tend to converge to
a single one. Therefore such multiple equilibria are treated as economically equivalent. In
other cases multiple equilibria have similar nodal prices and outputs, but are different in
the amount of power generated by different companies in each node. For example, for the
constrained oligopoly case (3) the total amount of power generated in Germany is the same
in all the equilibria, but in some equilibria EON produces more in Germany than in other,
leaving a smaller part of the German market for RWE. Nodal prices, nodal generation, nodal
consumption and flows remain the same. As the focus of this paper is on international, rather
than intranational competition, I do not distinguish between such equilibria and report only
total nodal generation and nodal prices. In figures 1.2 - 1.5 arrows indicate the direction of
the power flow. The thicker the arrow, the larger the flow is.
In section 1.2 I stated the key difference between this paper and Gabriel and Leuthold (2010),
from which the algorithm for solving each MPEC is taken: Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) model
power market of Western Europe as a monopolistic with just one strategic generating com-
pany and the rest behaving as competitive fringe. Table A.7 shows the influence the assump-
tion about the number of strategic players has on the equilibrium outcome. This influence
is especially noticeable for France and Belgium, as far more market power is exercised in
those countries in oligopoly compared to the cases when only local producer - EDF or EBEL
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Figure 1.2: Power flows and nodal prices (e/MWh) in perfect competition and oligopoly
1.2 (a) in perfect competition 1.2 (b) in oligopoly
- acts strategically. For more competitive Germany and the Netherlands the difference is less
prominent.
1.4.1 Strategic vs. competitive firms in unconstrained network
First of all, consider the effect the strategic behavior of large generating companies has in
unconstrained network. Compare the perfect competition outcome in column (2) of table
1.2 to the oligopoly outcome in column (4) of the same table. This hypothetical benchmark
case shows us how market power, not enhanced by limited transmission capacity, affects the
outcome. Unlimited transmission capacities mean that congestion and market separation
are not possible, hence nodal prices are the same in the entire network. In unconstrained
oligopoly prices increase by 36.4%, from 22 e/MWh to 30 e/MWh, but generation decreases
only in France. The reduction of output by EDF pushes prices up, creating a possibility for
other players to profit by increasing their generation with low cost technologies. As lines
are unconstrained, export is only limited by the amount of installed generation capacities
with low enough marginal costs. In equilibrium power flows are directed into France and the
Netherlands, where most of the generating units have marginal costs larger than the price.
Both nodal consumer surplus and nodal welfare decrease in oligopoly, with an exception of
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welfare increase in France - here the reduction in generation costs due to the reduced output
outweighs the reduction in gross surplus.
1.4.2 Strategic vs. competitive firms in constrained network
Next consider the same effect of strategic behavior of large generating companies compared
to a perfectly competitive outcome but in the constrained network. Comparing columns for
the constrained perfect competition case (1) and the constrained oligopoly case (3) gives an
idea of how the exercise of market power by dominant players shifts the equilibrium away
from the first-best solution. Not surprisingly, this shift is smaller in the nodes that have a
significant share of fringe suppliers. Take Germany and France. In Germany the competitive
fringe produces about 50% of power in both the competitive and the oligopolistic equilibria.
In oligopoly German generation level slightly decreases, while the price rises by 36.4%, from
22 e/MWh to 30 e/MWh. At the same time in France EDF cuts down its generation by 56%,
from 66.0 GW to 29.0 GW, causing the price to increase by a factor of 7.6 from 10 e/MWh
to 76 e/MWh. Market power abuse has different consequences for the smaller national
markets of Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium the strategic behavior of EBEL leads
to increases in both price and generation levels. This is due to the fact that despite the price
increase, Belgian electricity is still cheaper than French. Therefore part of it is exported by the
system operator into France, congesting French-Belgium interconnectors. As expected, in
constrained oligopoly (3), compared to constrained perfect competition (1), firms’ profits rise,
while consumer surpluses and welfare decrease. But there is an exception - the Netherlands.
In contrast to other countries, Dutch consumers are not worse-off in oligopoly. Moreover, in
node n5 they are better-off, as the price drops by 23.1% and consumer surplus increases by
32,7%. There are no strategic players in this node to exercise their market power. The ben-
eficial effect in oligopoly comes from a larger incoming power flow, as the strategic behavior
in the rest of the network changes flow pattern.
Different factors are at work in nodes n4 and n7, where prices and consumer surpluses
remain the same.15 Prices do not rise here as strategic players have to take into account
the presence of competitive fringe. If dominant generators would decide to cut their output,
prices would rise making generation facilities of price-taking firms profitable despite their high
marginal cost. Price-taking firms would then have an incentive to increase their production,
and strategic players would have to compete with them. In a sense, in those nodes first best
15There is a 0.67% consumer surplus decrease in node n7.
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prices are maintained in oligopoly due to a decision of dominant players to avoid competition.
1.4.3 Strategic firms in constrained vs. unconstrained networks
The effect of line capacity on competition is central for this study. Limited transmission ca-
pacities can enhance market power of local produces, or they can be sufficient enough to
effectively merge markets and suppress market power of local produces. If all the national
markets considered were to become one fully integrated market, that would mean a Cournot
competition with unlimited line capacities16, that is the unconstrained oligopoly case (4). The
closer the results of the constrained oligopoly (3) case are to those in case (4), the more
competitive the integrated market is.
In the constrained network French monopolist EDF is separated from other competitors by
interconnectors with limited transmission capacities. Free to exercise its market power, it
cuts down the generation to 29.0 GWh, compared to 47 GWh in the hypothetical uncon-
strained network. This substantial reduction of output in the large French market together
with constrained transmission capacities limits total import/export possibilities in the network.
Limited import/export possibilities in turn create an incentive for an increase in generation in
the Netherlands, as higher prices make more expensive generation technologies profitable.
Therefore, as markets of Belgium and Netherlands experience price increases compared to
the case (4), generation decreases only in one node n3.
In total, existing interconnector capacities enhance market power. Large national players are
able to set prices 38 - 153.3% higher compared to the market outcome in unconstrained
oligopoly. The only exception with unchanged prices and consumer surplus is Germany with
its large market share of competitive firms. Total consumer surplus in the network falls by
29.1%, welfare - by 10.0%. Those numbers reflect the potential for improvement of market
outcome by stimulating competition and demonstrate that in a completely deregulated market
with four large generating companies acting strategically, their market power will not be di-
minished by integration. Market power will be exercised as existing interconnector capacities
are insufficient to merge national markets into a single one. Without regulation integration
will fail to create a competitive market.
16See Borenstein et al. (2000) for a example with two monopolists.
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1.5 Stimulating competition
Since integration will not effectively curb market power of dominant players, further measures
would be required to strengthen competition. In the following section I evaluate the effects of
two possible policies: an increase of interconnector capacities and an increase in the number
of generation companies.
Expansion of interconnectors starts with answering a question which interconnectors should
be expanded and by how much. I focus on the welfare effect from expanding congested lines.
A similar approach was employed, for example, by Borenstein et al. (2000), who analyze the
impact from increasing the capacity of a congested transmission line known as path 15 on
the equilibrium in the electricity market in California. One should keep in mind that in a loop
flow environment it is possible that a change (an increase or a decrease) in transmission
capacities of uncongested lines can lead to welfare gains. Unfortunately, the search for the
socially optimal network structure would add to the model a third level and, with it, substantial
complexity to the calculation. Therefore I look at a specific project of expanding congested
lines.17
Increasing the number of generation companies is another way to intensify competition. The
increase can be achieved by stimulating entry or by division of a large existing players into
several independent ones. I consider the second option and propose a division plan inspired
by market restructuring in UK in 1990, when the generating capacities of the monopolistic
Central Electricity Generating Board were divided in three parts: one nuclear-only company
and two non-nuclear companies.18 The resulting market has been described as duopoly, as
the state owned Nuclear Electric supplied base load at a price below that of two dominant
17A more general approach is to identify the socially optimal network structure. As a benchmark, imagine we
forgo discussing all the existing or possible political institutions and focus on a simple case of centralized benev-
olent planning. Then the two-level model with strategic system operator and strategic generating companies
needs to be complemented by a new decision level with a benevolent planner. The planner knows the impact
transmission capacities have on the market equlibrium (or equilibria) and looks for a socially optimal network
in the earliest time period. The three stage model represents the idea of proactive transmission planning by
Sauma and Oren (2006), Pozo et al. (2013a) and Pozo et al. (2013b). Unfortunately, the third decision level adds
substantial complexity to the calculations. To avoid it, in all the mentioned papers the market for generation is
considered to be perfectly competitive. Such an assumption makes it impossible to study the effect the transmis-
sion capacities have on competition between strategic generators. Therefore it is unsuitable for the purposes of
this paper.
18See, for example, Wolfram (1999) and Woo et al. (2003).
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players.19 In the Western European market EDF is a clear candidate for the division. The
largest national markets in the model are Germany and France. They have approximately
the same amount of installed generation capacities (see table 1.1), but while German market
has two almost equal-sized strategic players and a competitive fringe with half of the total
market share, French market is monopolistic. Further in this section I propose the division
of EDF in three independent companies: one with all the nuclear generation capacities, and
two each with a half of all other generation capacities.
Further subsections discuss and compare three options for reduction of market power in an
integrated and deregulated Western European market: an expansion of interconnectors; a
restructuring of the French monopolist EDF with a complete privatization; a restructuring of
EDF with partial privatization and selective regulation of state owned nuclear generation. In
section 1.4 I have mentioned that a full integration of all Western European national markets
would be equivalent to the case of Cournot competition with unlimited line capacities. Al-
though large players act strategically in this hypothetical case of unconstrained oligopoly, they
have no possibility to exploit transmission constraints to their advantage. For this reason the
three proposed policies are compared (1) to the equilibrium in the constrained oligopoly, (2)
between each over, and (3) to the equilibrium in oligopoly with no transmission constraints.
Tables A.2 - A.6 in Appendices A.2 and A.3 provide values for the found market outcomes.
1.5.1 Expansion of interconnectors
In the deregulated Western European market three lines would be congested in the equilib-
rium as a result of the strategic behavior of four large generating companies. These lines are:
l10 (congested from Belgium to the Netherlands), l13 (congested from Belgium to France)
and l19 (congested from Germany to France). This subsection describes the equilibrium with
transmission constrains relaxed on these three lines, that is after they have been expanded
sufficiently enough to accommodate any potential power flows. The market outcome for this
case is presented in the table 1.3. The costs of network expansion are ignored. Once the ex-
19Several studies found evidence of market power abuse by two private generators. Green and Newbery
(1992) argue that the two firms were able to bid electricity with a high markup and manipulated market by
exploiting transmission constraints in the grid, while the Nash equilibrium with five firms would have been more
competitive. Newbery and Pollitt (1997) believe that creating more successor companies would have improved
the distribution of the net benefits and increased social welfare. On the other hand, Wolfram (1999) showed that
although prices after restructuring were higher than marginal costs, the exercise of market power was not nearly
as severe as most theoretical predictions.
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Table 1.3: Nodal generation (gen, GW) and nodal prices ( e/MWh) in oligopoly
unconstrained constrained relaxed
gen price gen price gen price
n1, Germany 71.0 30.0 61.3 30.0 62.3 30.0
n2, France 47.0 30.0 29.0 76.0 30.0 71.0
n3, Belgium 5.0 30.0 4.0 52.0 3.0 58.9
n6, Belgium 4.0 30.0 4.0 48.0 4.0 54.2
n4, Netherlands 4.0 30.0 4.3 45.0 8.0 46.5
n5, Netherlands 0 30.0 2.0 45.6 1.2 45.0
n7, Netherlands 1.0 30.0 4.0 41.4 2.0 40.7
pansion is carried out, total welfare increases by 0.95%, consumer surplus by 2.5%20, prices
in France drop just a little, while prices in Belgium rise. However, there is an issue with the
realization of the project.
Despite increases in total welfare and in total consumer surplus, Belgian consumers are
worse-off compared to the constrained oligopoly case, while EBEL’s profits rise. The exis-
tence of local winners and losers is an expected consequence of nodal pricing. As con-
sumers in different nodes pay different prices, an increase in a total welfare in the system
will not necessarily mean that everybody is better off. One should expect a redistribution
of welfare between the players as a result of a change in network structure. Since two of
the three expanded lines connect Belgium to its neighbors, Belgian consumers have an in-
centive to hinder the implementation of the proposed expansion if there are no subsequent
welfare transfers. Note that the reduction in Belgian nodal consumer surpluses is greater
than the increase in EBEL’s profit: total Belgian consumer surplus declines by 26 thousands
of euro per hour, while total profit of EBEL across network increases by only 23 thousands
of euro per hour. Despite this, a compensating mechanism is attainable, as total consumer
surplus increase across the network is larger than the reduction in total profits. The proposed
expansion project is possible, but it will require political decisions.
It should be mentioned that “possible” is not equal to “probable”. Any cross-country inter-
connect investment requires coordination between countries involved. An extreme example
of coordination failure can be found in the paper of Makkonen et al. (2015), who explore
the dependence of infrastructure development on institutional requirements and governance
structure. Even in the historically successful Nordic electricity market those dependencies
20See tables A.3 and A.4 in the appendix A.2.
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Figure 1.3: Power flows and nodal prices (e/MWh) in oligopoly before and after the network
expansion
1.3 (a) without line expansion 1.3 (b) with line expansion
have lead to an expansion of Hasle (Westlink) interconnector, considered critical by many,
being canceled. Small benefits from the proposed expansion of the three congested lines in
the Western European market should be weighted against almost certain high political costs.
1.5.2 Restructuring of French power generation
Division of EDF with complete privatization
Another option to increase competition in Western Europe is to restructure French generation
sector. Assume EDF is divided into three independent companies: one with all the nuclear
power plants, and two each with a half of all other generation capacities. Every successor
company is privatized and strategically chooses its level of output so as to maximize its profits
in the absence of any regulation. There are two Nash equilibria, listed in table 1.4 and A.2
- A.5 in separate columns. The main result of restructuring with complete privatization is as
expected: French consumers benefit while profits of French producers decline, as generation
level increases by 43.1-79.3 % and price falls by 36.0-52.7%.
Tables 1.4 and A.2 - A.5 compare the equilibria after restructuring with the equilibrium after
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Figure 1.4: Power flows and nodal prices (e/MWh) in oligopoly with division and complete
privatization of EDF
1.4 (a) 1st equilibrium 1.4 (b) 2nd equilibrium
line expansion. While line expansion increases total consumer surplus by about 2.5% and
total welfare by 0.95% compared to the constrained oligopoly case, the respective numbers
for the division and complete privatization of EDF are 19.4-30.4% and 5.8-7.4%. Depending
on the equilibrium, this restructuring scenario leads to the total consumer surplus just 7.6-
15.4% below the one in the unconstrained oligopoly. Against the same benchmark, in the
relaxed equilibrium consumer surplus is smaller by 27.3%, and in the the constrained equi-
librium - by 29.1%. Not surprisingly, the improvement is achieved by a significant decrease
in the exercise of market power in France.
Division of EDF with partial privatization
Finally, consider a restructuring scenario closer to the reform of the British energy sector. As
before, the French monopolist is divided in three independent companies, but now the new
nuclear company is not privatized and is kept as a public utility subject to perfectly efficient
price regulation. That is, it is considered to be a price-taker whose output in the model
is determined by the system operator. RWE, EON, EBEL and two non-nuclear successor
companies of EDF strategically choose their level of output so as to maximize their profits in
the absence of any regulation.
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Table 1.4: Nodal generation (gen, GW) and nodal prices (e/MWh) in oligopoly, with two
equilibria for the case of complete privatization of EDF
unconstrained constrained privatization of EDF
complete partial
1st eq. 2nd eq.
gen price gen price gen price gen price gen price
n1, Germany 71.0 30.0 61.3 30.0 59.2 30.0 61.8 30.0 55.6 30.0
n2, France 47.0 30.0 29.0 76.0 52.0 35.9 41.5 48.6 67.0 10.0
n3, Belgium 5.0 30.0 4.0 52.0 2.5 42.5 4.0 46.3 1.0 66.2
n6, Belgium 4.0 30.0 4.0 48.0 3.5 43.8 4.0 46.3 2.5 47.3
n4, Netherlands 4.0 30.0 4.3 45.0 4.5 45.0 4.8 45.0 5.4 45.0
n5, Netherlands 0 30.0 2.0 45.6 2.0 50.2 2.0 47.8 2.0 46.5
n7, Netherlands 1.0 30.0 4.0 41.4 3.0 40.2 3.0 40.5 4.0 41.0
In this case there is one Nash equilibrium. As expected, keeping the large nuclear generation
capacities as a public utility leads to a more competitive outcome, allowing to attain first-best
result in France. Competitive French nuclear power plants work at almost full capacity, while
French strategic players only produce with hydro utilities, using them up to full capacity. An
important result concerns consumer surpluses, reported in table A.4. French consumer sur-
plus with partial privatization of EDF is higher than in the unconstrained oligopoly case. In
other words, such restructuring of French generation leads to greater benefits for French con-
sumers (but lower profits for French generators) than an infinite increase of line capacities.
At the same time, market power will still be exercised in Belgium and, to a lesser degree, in
the Netherlands.
The difference in the exercise of market power in those two countries is worth mention-
ing. In the equilibrium generation in Belgium is carried out on the nuclear power plants with
marginal costs of 10 e/MWh, whereas in the Netherlands active power plants have marginal
costs ranging from 22 e/MWh for coal to 45 e/MWh for gas. Based on this generation struc-
ture, one would expect lower prices in Belgium, but market structure differences lead to an
opposite result. There are no fringe firms in Belgium, and Dutch-German interconnectors
are larger compared to Belgian-French ones. Keep in mind that in the equilibrium nodal price
depends on the marginal unit consumed. That unit can be imported depending on the output
choices of domestic producers. Given this, one can see from table 1.4 that price markups in
Belgium are higher than in the Netherlands, despite the fact that in Belgium there are more
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Figure 1.5: Power flows and nodal prices (e/MWh) in oligopoly with divided EDF and regu-
lated nuclear generation
generating capacities with lower marginal costs than in the Netherlands.
Both in terms of total welfare and of total consumer surplus the restructuring of EDF with
partial privatization outperforms restructuring of EDF with complete privatization, which in
turn outperforms the expansion of lines congested in oligopoly. In terms of total consumer
surplus the partial privatization also outperforms an infinite increase in the capacity of every
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inteconnector in the network.21
Similar result have been found in Tanaka (2009) - increasing the bottleneck capacity leads to
welfare gains, that are not substantial once expansion costs are taken into account, and that
are lower than welfare gains from the divestiture of the largest company. In case of Tanaka
(2009), this result is not surprising, as he assumed that generating firms can’t correctly an-
ticipate the effect of their output on flows and congestion, i.e in his model generating firms
do not exploit transmission constraints in their exercise of market power. In this paper gener-
ators are not ”naive” and they can exploit transmission constraints to keep competition out of
their markets. Given this assumption, one could have expected that expansion of congested
lines would have a greater effect on market power and, consequently, on social welfare. As
this paper shows, it is not the case. Relieving most pressing, or even all bottlenecks may still
be not as beneficial as restructuring.
1.6 Conclusion and policy implications
Integration is expected to make regional dominant players small in the integrated market,
thereby enforcing competition without much regulation. Insufficient transmission capacities,
however, can prevent full integration of national electricity markets into a singe one, allowing
dominant players to continue the exercise of market power.
This paper investigates the potential for an increase of competition in an integrated West-
ern European electricity market. The analysis of market equilibria allows me to conclude
that existing interconnector capacities are insufficient to reduce the ability of large national
players to exercise market power without regulation. Additional measures are needed to
21At the suggestion of one of the reviewers, a robustness check was performed with lower marginal cost
for gas generation units, equal to 40 instead of 45 e/MWh. Four scenarios were considered: oligopoly in a
constrained network of Western European market, oligopoly in an expanded network, and restructuring of EDF
with complete or partial privatization. A change in marginal costs for gas results in just two lines congested
in the initial scenario: l13 (congested from Belgium to France) and l19 (congested from Germany to France).
Line l10, that was congested from Belgium to the Netherlands with higher marginal cost for gas generation
units, is not used up to its maximum capacity in this scenario. Therefore in expanded network only these two
lines – l13 and l19 - were assumed to be upgraded sufficiently enough to accommodate any potential power
flows. The key conclusion of previous analysis - that both in terms of total welfare and of total consumer surplus
restructuring of EDF with partial privatization outperforms restructuring of EDF with complete privatization, which
in turn outperforms the expansion of lines congested in oligopoly - holds in the robustness check with lower
marginal cost for gas generation units. See table A.8 for the nodal prices, total welfare and total consumer
surplus in the network under a different assumption on gas generation units.
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enhance competition in the integrated market. The effects from three possible policies are
compared: an expansion of interconnectors; a restructuring of French monopolist Electricite´
de France with complete privatization; and a restructuring of Electricite´ de France with partial
privatization and selective regulation of the nuclear generation.
The comparison of those competition enhancing policies shows the following. First, if the
three interconnectors congested in oligopoly would have capacity sufficiently high to accom-
modate any potential flows, total consumer surplus and total welfare would not increase as
much as in case of restructuring of French generation sector. That is, in this example network
expansion can not substitute the restructuring. Moreover, the change in the network struc-
ture leads to the redistribution of welfare. Political issue of local winners and loosers is further
sharpened by the fact that in the considered set-up Belgian consumers are worse-off after
the grid upgrade is performed, and two of the expanded lines connect Belgium to the neigh-
boring countries. Thus the implementation of the proposed expansion scenario depends on
the existence of welfare transfers in the networks. This example highlights the importance of
cross-border investment mechanism. Economic analysis can assess benefits from line ex-
pansion, but the institutional framework surrounding cross-border investment decisions will
determine the set of feasible expansions projects on the way to a single European market.
Second, restructuring is even more beneficial when combined with regulation. Total con-
sumer surplus and total welfare in Western Europe increase further if French nuclear gen-
eration capacities are effectively regulated. Such a restructuring allows to achieve first best
price and generation levels in France, the country with the highest exercise of market power
under existing market structure and network constrains. Furthermore, this reform leads to
the total consumer surplus higher compared to the hypothetical case of oligopoly with uncon-
strained lines, when strategic players have no possibility to exploit transmission constraints
to their advantage. It is important to point out that the costs of both policies – line expansion
and restructuring – are left out of the calculation. A rough estimate for the first one can be
obtained by multiplying the length of expanded interconnectors by the value of upgrade by
grid upgrade costs.22 In the analysis I have assumed that three lines were expanded enough
to accommodate any possible line flows, i.e. in the calculation their capacity was set to be ex-
tremely high. If we assume that the capacity of the those lines is at least doubled, estimated
cost would be more than 255 million euro. An estimate for the restructuring cost is harder to
obtain. But even if network expansion costs would be the same as the costs of restructuring
22An estimate for the length of the expanded lines can be made based on ENTSO-E grid map,
see ENTSO-E web page: https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/order-maps-and-publications/electronic-grid-
maps/Pages/default.aspx. Grid upgrade costs were taken from taken from Fu¨rsch et al. (2013), table A.6
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utilities, grid upgrade does not produce the same increase in the social welfare.
These results allow me to conclude that although in an aggregated representation of Western
European electricity market an increase of line capacity is a useful tool to stimulate compe-
tition in an integrated market, it is not a substitute for the regulation of large players. It is
important to note that this analysis has been carried out on a relatively old data set with only
one demand scenario. Therefore the results here can’t be treated as a base for current policy
recommendations, but they rather demonstrate possible outcomes in the network of Western
European electricity market. Note that a firm can have a possibility to exercise of market
power but may choose not to do so. According to the consumption data from ENTSO-E
for 2003, the year the linear demand function is based on, this is exactly what happened:
observed market outcome corresponds to the predicted results for the case of division of
EDF with complete privatization. Exact present day policy recommendations require a fur-
ther study on a larger data set, covering more countries and more typical hours, to estimate
the exact impact of interconnector capacities on the exercise of market power in the current
conditions of European market.
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Appendix A
Transmission capacities and
competition in Western European
electricity market
A.1 Network parameters
Table A.1: Line parameters in the fifteen-node Western Eu-
ropean network, source: (Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010)
line capacities (MW) reactance (Ω)
l1 2970 12
l2 1840 69
l3 1840 43
l4 900 28
l5 1330 25
l6 1840 33
l7 1840 50
l8 1840 29
l9 640 61
l10 640 42
l11 940 34
l12 1840 31
l13 900 55
l14 1210 45
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l15 270 156
l16 2760 22
l17 1840 27
l18 3330 38
l19 1280 11
l20 3330 41
l21 ∞ 46
l22 ∞ 46
l23 ∞ 46
l24 ∞ 46
l25 ∞ 46
l26 ∞ 46
l27 ∞ 46
l28 ∞ 46
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A.2 Equilibria in the market
First best results in a constrained network are taken from Gabriel and Leuthold (2010), first best results in an unconstrained were
calculated based on the code from Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) with transmission constraints ignored in the calculation.
Table A.2: Nodal generation, GWh
first best oligopoly
privatization of EDF EDF competitive
node constrained unconstrained constrained unconstrained relaxed complete partial constrained unconstrained
1st 2nd
n1, Germany 62.2 61.7 61.3 71.0 62.3 59.2 61.8 55.6 55.6 59.8
n2, France 66.0 73.0 29.0 47.0 30.0 52.0 41.5 67.0 67.4 73.0
n3, Belgium 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 3.0 2.5 4.0 1.0 1.0 3.0
n6, Belgium 3.5 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 2.5 2.5 3.0
n4, Netherlands 4.6 0.1 4.3 4.0 8.0 4.5 4.8 5.4 5.4 2.0
n5, Netherlands 2.0 0 2.0 0 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0
n7, Netherlands 2.0 0 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 0
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Table A.3: Nodal prices,e/MWh
first best oligopoly
privatization of EDF EDF competitive
node constrained unconstrained constrained unconstrained relaxed complete partial constrained unconstrained
1st 2nd
n1, Germany 22.0 22.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 22.0
n2, France 10.0 22.0 76.0 30.0 71.0 35.9 48.6 10.0 10.0 22.0
n3, Belgium 10.0 22.0 52.0 30.0 58.9 42.5 46.3 66.2 66.2 22.0
n6, Belgium 22.0 22.0 48.0 30.0 54.2 43.8 46.3 47.3 47.3 22.0
n4, Netherlands 45.0 22.0 45.0 30.0 46.5 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 22.0
n5, Netherlands 59.3 22.0 45.6 30.0 45.0 50.2 47.8 46.5 46.5 22.0
n7, Netherlands 41.4 22.0 41.4 30.0 40.7 40.2 40.5 41.0 41.0 22.0
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Table A.4: Hourly consumer surpluses, thousands of euro
first best oligopoly
privatization of EDF
node constrained unconstrained constrained unconstrained relaxed complete partial
1st 2nd
n1, Germany 3959 3960 3480 3480 3480 3480 3480 3480
n2, France 4410 3686 1232 3240 1401 2927 2313 4410
n3, Belgium 245 205 120 180 104 144 134 88
n6, Belgium 137 137 87 120 77 94 90 88
n4, Netherlands 276 410 276 360 268 276 276 276
n5, Netherlands 205 410 272 360 276 249 261 267
n7, Netherlands 148 205 147 180 149 151 150 148
Total 9 379 9 011 5 614 7 920 5 754 7 321 6 703 8 757
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Table A.5: Hourly welfare, thousands of euro
first best oligopoly
privatization of EDF
node constrained unconstrained constrained unconstrained relaxed complete partial
1st 2nd
n1, Germany 4255 4267 4171 3962 4137 4210 4250 4283
n2, France 4519 4354 3613 4530 3766 4165 4138 4506
n3, Belgium 254 245 195 196 208 234 202 216
n6, Belgium 142 153 116 128 111 130 118 144
n4, Netherlands 396 549 409 452 240 399 389 361
n5, Netherlands 384 550 420 540 458 410 415 418
n7, Netherlands 199 275 110 240 200 156 156 110
Total 10 152 10 393 9 035 10 048 9 121 9 704 9 568 10 039
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A.3 Firms’ profits
Table A.6: Hourly profits, thousands of euro
EBEL EDF EON RWE j1
perfect competition, constrained lines
Germany 98.0 94.0 112.0
France 140.0
Belgium 36.0
Netherlands 45.7 23.0 74.7
oligopoly, constrained lines
Germany 194.0 220.0 392.0
France 2054.1
Belgium 295.9
Netherlands 38.6 23.0 47.2
oligopoly, unconstrained lines
Germany 226.0 254.0 392.0
France 1080.0
Belgium 144.0
Netherlands 8.0 8.0 16.0
oligopoly, relaxed lines
Germany 226.0 170.0 392.0
France 1972.3
Belgium 311.4
Netherlands 46.1 24.5 55.0
division of EDF with complete privatization - 1st equilibrium
Germany 190.0 185.0 392.0
France (371.8+370.9+518.6)23
Belgium 193.7
Netherlands 38.7 23.0 56.4
division of EDF with complete privatization - 2nd equilibrium
Germany 226.0 165.0 392.0
23Hourly profits of two non-nuclear and one nuclear company correspondingly.
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EBEL EDF EON RWE j1
France (474.3+474.3+675.6)24
Belgium 266.4
Netherlands 39.6 23.0 51.7
division of EDF with partial privatization
Germany 190.0 150.0 392.0
France (70.0+70.0)25
Belgium 149.4
Netherlands 37.1 23.0 49.1
A.4 Comparison with the results of Gabriel and Leuthold (2010)
Table A.7: Nodal prices, e/MWh. Columns with first best results and cases (a)-(d) taken from
Gabriel and Leuthold (2010), table 18. Last column refers to the equilibrium in the market
when all four companies EBEL, EDF, EON, RWE - act strategically, i.e. to the solution of the
corresponding EPEC.
node first best only one strategic firm oligopoly
(a) (b) (c) (d)
EBEL EDF EON RWE
n1, Germany 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 29.4 30.0
n2, France 10.0 10.0 41.7 10.0 10.0 76.0
n3, Belgium 10.0 58.4 22.0 10.0 10.0 52.0
n6, Belgium 22.0 52.1 30.0 22.0 22.0 48.0
n4, Netherlands 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0
n5, Netherlands 59.3 45.0 57.2 59.3 58.9 45.6
n7, Netherlands 41.3 38.2 41.2 41.3 44.8 41.4
24Hourly profits of two non-nuclear and one nuclear company correspondingly.
25Hourly profits of two non-nuclear companies.
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A.5 Robustness check for lower marginal cost with gas genera-
tion units
Table A.8: Nodal prices, e/MWh, total hourly welfare and total hourly consumer surplus
(CS), thousands of euro, calculated under assumption of marginal cost for gas generation
units equal to 40 e/MWh
oligopoly
privatization of EDF
constrained relaxed complete partial
n1, Germany 30.0 30.0 30.0 28.5
n2, France 76.0 72.9 49.7 10.8
n3, Belgium 49.8 56.7 43.0 56.9
n6, Belgium 41.1 53.5 42.3 42.5
n4, Netherlands 40.0 45.6 40.0 40.0
n5, Netherlands 40.9 43.7 40.7 40.6
n7, Netherlands 37.8 40.0 37.0 36.8
welfare 9 054 9 076 9 576 10 010
CS 5 692 5 711 6 791 8 886
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Chapter 2
Anticompetitive effects of RES infeed
in a transmission-constrained
network
Abstract
In the process of the de-carbonization of the power industry many countries are adding sub-
stantial capacities of wind and solar based power generation to their portfolio. While owner-
ship of conventional capacities is typically concentrated, renewable energy is often provided
by small, independent producers. Hence, one might expect competitive pressure to increase
as renewable energy production is ramped up. In this paper we show that with insufficient
transmission capacities, an increase of renewable infeed in the surplus region might lead to a
decline in total generation and consumer surplus in the market. The reason for this somewhat
counter-intuitive effect is a switch from an equilibrium in which the market is fully integrated
to an equilibrium in which transmission constraint is binding. The resulting fragmentation of
the market allows the dominant conventional producers to exploit their local market power
more aggressively.
Keywords: renewable energy, electricity transmission, capacity constraints, market power,
Germany
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2.1 Introduction
In the process of the de-carbonization of the electric power industry many countries are
adding substantial capacities of such intermittent renewable energy sources (RES) as wind
and solar based power to their portfolio. At the same time, little conventional capacity is
being retired, as it is needed for those times when RES generation is low. While ownership
of conventional capacities is highly concentrated in many regions of Europe, the potential
for the abuse of market power should decline as RES generation increases. First, in many
countries wind and solar energy is provided by new, independent producers. Hence, for
an incumbent the infra-marginal gains from increasing the price by withholding supply are
diminished. Second, given their low variable cost, RES production is first in the merit order
and the incumbent will dispatch conventional plants at the margin, which have lower cost,
compared to dispatch without RES. Then at a given price, the marginal profit of the incumbent
with market power would increase, making it more costly to withhold supply. Both effects
suggest that competitive pressure in the electric power industry should increase as RES
production is ramped up.
However, the ideal locations for wind and solar power generation are often distant from where
demand resides. RES energy has to be transported over long distances to the customers and
current transmission systems are poorly designed for this new task. This is particularly true
for wind power produced in coastal areas. For example Germany rapidly increased its wind
power capacity but failed to keep up with the complementary network expansion. As a result,
the transmission system became increasingly congested. The volume of curtailed energy
has grown dramatically since 2010 (Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt, 2019). In
2015-2017 each year from 4.4 to 5.1% of wind generation could not be injected because
the transmission system was insufficient to transport the energy to the customers.26 With
insufficient transmission capacities, the intuition developed in the previous paragraph can be
misleading. The benefits of independent production for competition may get lost and even
turn into the opposite.
In this paper we show that with sufficiently limited transmission capacities an increase of
RES production may lead to a decline in competition, hence consumer surplus and perhaps
even welfare. The narrative is as follows: consider two incumbents ”North” and ”South”,
both dominating their respective area, and assume that the transmission capacity between
26See Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2017a), page 101, Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartel-
lamt (2017b), page 110 and Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2019), page 141 for curtailed wind en-
ergy, and Fraunhofer ISE (2018) for total annual wind generation.
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the two regions is limited. Suppose we start from an equilibrium in which the transmission
constraint is not binding. As we have the same price in both regions and both companies
compete for the whole market, we will refer to this situation as an integrated market. Now
let RES production gradually increase, but only in the north. With an uncongested transmis-
sion line, the duopolists will partially offset the increase but total generation will increase in
equilibrium and the price and profits will decline. At some point however, the producer in the
south may find it more profitable to focus entirely on her local market while accommodating
maximal imports. By cutting back supply she allows the transmission line to congest, so
that she becomes a monopolist for the residual local demand. The counter-intuitive effect of
RES infeed on consumer surplus is a result of a switch from an equilibrium without binding
transmission constraints, the integrated market, to an equilibrium with binding transmission
constraint, to which we will refer as a fragmented market. The resulting fragmentation of the
market allows the dominant player to exploit her local market power.
We model a electric power market in which generators recognize that they compete not only
with other producers at their own node, but, subject to transmission constraints, also with
producers in the rest of the network. Cardell et al. (1997) have been the first to demonstrate
strategic congestion as a possible feature of an equilibrium in such a market. They develop
a fictitious network with loop flows, where players may find it profitable to either increase
or restrict output, congesting the line either from or into her area of dominance. Borenstein
et al. (2000) then laid the analytical foundation for the study of market equilibria in a setting of
spatial competition. Their focus was on the central role of transmission capacity. For a simple
two nodes / one line network Borenstein et al. (2000) describe and relate the possible pure
and mixed strategy Nash equilibria to the capacity of the transmission line. Their analysis
reveals two important thresholds. The first is the maximum line capacity that allows for an
equilibrium with strategic congestion on the line. The second is the minimum line capacity
for which an unconstrained Cournot equilibrium is feasible. Depending on the asymmetries
between the two nodes, for the capacities between the two thresholds either two or no pure
strategy Nash equilibria will exist.
Among others Neuhoff et al. (2005), Ehrenmann and Neuhoff (2009), Gabriel and Leuthold
(2010), and Spiridonova (2016) look at market power in more realistic, multi-node and multi-
line networks. The application of this approach to a more complex networks, however, proved
to be cumbersome, because the resulting mathematical model is in general non-convex and
difficult to solve.27 In their paper Neuhoff et al. (2005) demonstrate that the analysis is greatly
27For one strategic generator, the problem of profit maximization subject to first order necessary optimality con-
ditions from the system operator’s problem will be a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).
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simplified by assuming that generators are myopic, ignoring their influence on transmission
constraints. However the resulting equilibrium price will be lower, hence, the potential for the
abuse of market power is underestimated.
In this paper we stick to the simple network model of Borenstein et al. (2000) and assume that
generators understand how to manipulate congestion for their advantage. In the next section
we describe methodology and use graphical tools borrowed from Borenstein et al. (2000)
to illustrate how the nature of the spatial equilibrium may change as RES infeed increases.
Then we calibrate the model with German data and find that, given current transmission ca-
pacities, higher wind infeed, in fact, increases the potential for the abuse of market power.28
For a relevant range of parameters, an increase of wind infeed causes the equilibrium to
switch, first from a pure strategy unconstrained equilibrium to an equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies, and finally to a pure strategy constrained equilibrium. Over the intermediate range
(expected) total output and consumer surplus (occasionally even total welfare) will decline.
In the last section we discuss alternative measures to solve the problem such as maintaining
enough competitive pressure in the deficit areas and increasing transmission capacity.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Method description
We distinguish only two nodes ”North” and ”South” connected with a transmission line of
limited capacity k. There is demand in both nodes, and one strategic firm (N and S re-
spectively) with market power in each node. The line is operated by a system operator, who
collects quantity bids and clears the markets by setting nodal prices in order to maximize
social welfare. While this institutional setting is atypical for European countries, it yields a
clear benchmark against which we can discuss alternative institutional arrangements. It also
reflects market coupling between different price-zones in Europe reasonably well.
We adopt the approach of Borenstein et al. (2000), who focused on the influence of transmis-
sion capacity on the pure strategy equilibrium in spatial competition with players that know
Finding a market equilibrium with several strategic generators will require solving a system of MPECs, or an
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). A number of papers, for example, Fortuny-Amat and
McCarl (1981) and Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) address the challenges of finding a solution for an MPEC.
28For the German transmission grid the relevant RES infeed is from wind turbines which are concentrated in
the north. Generation from photovoltaic is more of a challenge for distribution networks.
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how to influence line flow and congestion to their advantage. In their paper characteristics
of the residual demand, that each strategic player faces, were constant. In contrast, we
consider the effect fluctuating RES supply has on the equilibrium: the larger the competitive
generation in a node, the less residual demand is left for the strategic player in that node, the
more the nodal residual demand curve is shifted to the left. With a linear demand assump-
tion, this translates into demand intercept decreasing by demand slope times RES infeed.
In our calibration, wind infeed takes place only in the node north. Although this assumption
is an obvious simplification, it captures problems arising due to the region with high RES
potential being located away from the load center.
Given that strategic conventional players know how to manipulate the flow in the network to
their advantage, for any level of opponent’s output a strategic player has three options. She
can decide to generate enough power so that the transmission constraint is not binding, or
it is binding in either export or import direction. That is, the profit function of each strategic
conventional player is piece-wise. It consists of the three sections.
In the case of transmission constraint binding in the direction from north to south, the corre-
sponding profits of strategic players S and N are:
πMIS = pS(gS + k) · gS − cS · g3S/3 (2.1a)
πMEN = pN (gN + w − k) · gN − cN · g3N/3 (2.1b)
In the case of non-binding transmission constraint, the corresponding profits of strategic
players S and N are:
πintS = pint(gN + gS + w) · gS − cS · g3S/3 (2.2a)
πintN = pint(gN + gS + w) · gN − cN · g3N/3 (2.2b)
In the case of transmission constraint binding in the direction from south to north, the corre-
sponding profits of strategic players S and N are:
πMES = pS(gS − k) · gS − cS · g3S/3 (2.3a)
πMIN = pN (gN + w + k) · gN − cN · g3N/3 (2.3b)
Where p(q) = a− b · q denotes the inverse demand29, g the power generated, c the marginal
cost coefficient (see section 2.3 for more details), and w wind production. Indices S and
29I.e., price depending on consumption. Consumption in each market consists of local generation plus net
imports.
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N refer to strategic players. Index MI refers to a monopolist facing residual demand con-
strained by import into her node, ME - to a monopolist facing residual demand expanded by
exports out of her node. Index int refers to the integrated market.
2.2.2 Equilibria
Borenstein et al. (2000) have demonstrated that in this set-up two pure strategy equilibria
are possible: an equilibrium without binding transmission constraint, and an equilibrium with
binding transmission constraint.
Without binding transmission constraint the markets are integrated and the pure strategy
equilibrium is a standard Cournot case. The equilibrium outputs g∗N and g
∗
S can be obtained
as the positive root of the polynomials from the first order conditions to maximization of
equations (2.2a) and (2.2b).
An equilibrium with binding transmission constraint involves one strategic player exporting as
much as possible (k), while another accepts imports in her market and behaves as a mo-
nopolist on the remaining demand. Hence Borenstein et al. (2000) call this type of equilibria
”passive-aggressive”. In our calibration fragmented market involves line congestion from
north to south: as much as possible is exported from the node with cheap RES power to the
node with large demand. The equilibrium outputs gMEN and g
MI
S can be obtained from the
first order conditions to maximization of equations (2.1a) and (2.1b).
2.2.3 Graphical illustration
In figure 2.1 we plot the southern firm’s best response BS to any quantity n generated in
the north. The dashed line is the (usual) unconstrained Cournot best response function.
For a transmission constraint which is sufficiently tight, this function has to be modified. For
the best response BS we can distinguish four ranges. First, consider the response to very
low generation in the North. As line capacity is small compared to demand in the North,
S produces the monopoly quantity for the South and exports as much as possible to the
North (SME , see equation 2.3a). For n ∈ [0, n0) the price in the North is higher than in the
South and the line is congested towards the North. A small increase of n is fully absorbed
in the north, where it reduces the price. As it does not change the optimal response of S,
prices in the South are constant in this range. At n0 however, any further increase of n
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Figure 2.1: A transmission constrained reaction function
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would make the line uncongested. As S is well below her unconstrained best response, she
increases the output to keep the line congested towards the North, preventing competitor
from entering her market. For n ∈ [n0, n1] prices in both regions are decreasing in n. When
hitting the unconstrained best response at n1 the regime changes again and the transmission
constraint stops to bind. For n ∈ [n1, n2] we have the textbook case of a unified market
with pN = pS and S responding to an increase of output in the North by reducing her own
output (strategic substitutes). Total output increases in n and the uniform price as well as
S’s profit declines. However, contrary to the textbook case the profit will not decline towards
zero. Given a transmission capacity which is small in relation to demand in the South, S
can always choose to accommodate the maximal import k and become a monopolist for the
residual demand in the South, producing SMI (see equation 2.1a). Suppose it is at output
n2 where the profit from competing in the whole market becomes equal to the profit of such
passive monopolist. Here a small increase of n triggers a drop in generation in the South
and the line becomes congested towards the South. This discontinuous drop of generation
in the South in response to a small increase of generation in the North results in a decrease
of total power generation and welfare. For n > n2, any further increase of generation in the
North will not change the price in the South.
In most cases we will have substantial conventional production also in those regions with
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Figure 2.2: A change of equilibrium
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temporarily high wind infeed. To account for this feature, consider a strategic firm N which
generates gN from the conventional generation capacities in the North. Total generation in
the North is then gN + w, with w denoting the infeed from wind turbines (and other fringe
generators). The best response of the northern incumbent, BN (gS , w), depends on gener-
ation in the south gS and on wind infeed in the North w. Recall that BS has been defined
as a best response to the total generation in the North, irrespective of its source. Hence,
it does not change with increased wind infeed, as seen in figure 2.2. In this figure we start
from a situation in which there is no wind infeed (w = 0) and assume that we would have an
equilibrium without congestion. It is indicated by the two solidly drawn best response func-
tions BS and BN (gS , 0) with the standard Cournot-equilibrium marked as C. Now suppose
that wind infeed increases to w¯. Although N will reduce its output in response to wind gen-
eration in its own market (as indicated by the dotted function BN (gS , w¯)), total generation in
the North, the dashed line labelled BN (gS , w¯) + w¯ will increase. As a result the equilibrium
switches from one with non-binding transmission constraint to the one with strategic conges-
tion on the line (”passive-aggressive” equilibrium), marked as PA in figure 2.2, with lower
total power generation.
Obviously, this is only one of several possibilities. Depending on the demand and the genera-
tion cost in the two regions and on the transmission capacity there also may be two equilibria
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or no equilibrium in pure strategies (Borenstein et al. (2000), theorem 5). To address the
practical relevance of these theoretical possibilities we have to calibrate the model with rea-
sonable parameters which leads us to the next section.
2.3 Calibration
In the following we calibrate the two node model assuming linear demand functions and
quadratic marginal cost functions using data from the German/Austrian electric power mar-
ket. In principle, this region is a good example for the issues we want to address. It has
large wind infeed in the north-east, substantial power consumption in the south-west and a
transmission systems which struggles to cope with the new challenge. Some other features,
however, do not correspond well with our simple model. First, the market is operated as
one price-zone with redispatch rather than as a two node system. Second, the conventional
capacities are distributed not among two, but among several large firms. We will address the
relevance of these features in the concluding section.30
2.3.1 Network and transmission capacity
Even in times of low wind infeed and slack transmission capacity, the dominant direction of
power flows in the German grid is from north to south. Large low cost generation capacities
are located in the north while important centres of consumption are in the south and south-
west. As most nuclear power stations are located in the south, this imbalance is set to
increase with the nuclear phase out.31 When wind infeed is strong, transmission constraints
tend to bind in central Germany from the state Lower Saxony into the states of North Rhine-
Westphalia and Saxony as well as from Saxony-Anhalt into Bavaria. If combined with strong
load, a broader corridor of lines become congested, but the pattern is the same: lines towards
the south or south-west are affected most. Congestion is quite common in Germany. In
30We calibrate the model on the data referring to the time when Germany and Austria were in one price zone,
prior to the zone split along the border on October 1st 2018. We have performed a robustness check on the
Germany only data. This calibration produces slightly different numerical results, but our key findings - the non-
monotonic dependence of consumption, prices and consumer surpluses on renewable infeed - remain. Therefore
we proceed with our German/Austrian calibration.
31See Egerer et al. (2016) and Egerer et al. (2014), page 29 for nuclear power plant locations.
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2014-2016 redispatch measures were taken on more than 300 days each year.32 Feed-
in management, or curtailment of RES infeed in cases when network capacities are not
sufficient to transport the total amount of electricity generated, increased dramatically since
2010 (Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt, 2019). The high incidence of congestion in
Germany has led the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to pressure
for the splitting up of the price zone. Such a split would help to alleviate loop flows which
have to be accommodated by neighbouring states, in particular Poland and Czech Republic
(ACER, 2015b; ENTSO-E, 2012). Politicians reluctantly bowed to the pressure by separating
Austria from Germany — a move which will become effective in September 2018. But at the
time of writing, there are little signs that German politics is prepared to allow for the more
relevant splitting of the German market.
For the calibration we aggregate in the node North the federal states of Berlin, Branden-
burg, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt
and Schleswig-Holstein. The node South includes the federal states Baden-Wuerttemberg,
Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Thuringia, as
well as Austria and Luxembourg.33
Unfortunately, the line capacities in a meshed network do not translate directly into available
transmission capacities. Analysing flow data from all German TSOs for the European Com-
mission, Thema (2013) conclude that ”there is large uncertainty around the actual internal
transmission capacities within Germany”. To account for this uncertainty Thema (2013) con-
sider scenarios of 7 GW, 10 GW, 13 GW and 16 GW of available transmission capacities
between the north and the south of Germany (Thema (2013), pages 22 and 37). As our def-
initions of nodes is very similar, we consider the same range of capacities. Germany makes
efforts to enhance its north-south transmission capacities by another 8 GW by 2025, but the
projects are behind schedule and wind capacities are also scheduled to increase in the same
time period up to 60.6 GW in the north and up to 13 GW in the south of Germany (Fraunholz
and Hladik, 2018).
32See Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2016), page 100; Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartel-
lamt (2017a), page 94; Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2017b), page 102; Forschungsstelle fu¨r En-
ergiewirtschaft (2015), chapters 2 and 3. Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2017a), Section C.5.1 at-
tributes high redispatch volume in 2015 not only to the delays in line expansion, but also to high level of installed
wind capacity and relatively windy weather.
33A similar division of federal states is used in Thema (2013). Egerer et al. (2016) use a slightly different
division assigning Nordrhein-Westfalen and Thuringia to the north.
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Table 2.1: Intercept and slope parameters of inverse demand
mean scenario peak scenario
integrated North South integrated North South
intercept (a) 164.00 158.58
slope coefficient (b) 1.98187 7.92749 2.6425 1.22645 4.9058 1.63527
Table 2.2: Marginal costs (mc) and installed generation capacities (gen)
waste biomass hydro nuclear lignite hard gas other oil
& biogas coal fossil
mc, [e/MWh] 0 0 0 10 20 40 80 80 100
gen, [GW]
North 0.6 0.6 1.5 4.1 10.4 7.4 6.9 0.7 1.7
South 1.0 0.6 11.4 6.7 10.4 19.9 15.6 1.7 2.0
2.3.2 Demand and cost
We assume a linear inverse demand function and consider two scenarios: mean and peak.
The demand function for each scenario is estimated as passing through a corresponding
reference point, determined for 2014 based on the load data from ENTSO-E and the price
data from EEX: mean load 66.2 GW and price 32.8 e/MWh; peak load 86.2 GW and price
52.9 e/MWh.34 Following Leuthold et al. (2005) and Leuthold et al. (2008) we assume de-
mand elasticity of -0.25 at the mean reference point. For the peak scenario we assume a
higher demand elasticity of -0.5. Next we decompose total demand into two nodal demands
in proportion to the GDP of the respective region. The smaller Northern node accounts for
25% of total GDP, while the Southern node accounts for the remaining 75%.35 The resulting
parameters are given in table 2.1.
To obtain marginal costs, we construct a merit order curve for each node combining the infor-
mation on conventional installed capacities in Germany, Austria and Luxembourg obtained
via Open Power System Data (2016) and marginal costs estimations based on Egerer et al.
34For the peak demand scenario hourly loads in 2014 in the price zone of Germany, Austria and Luxembourg
were sorted from highest to lowest. The peak reference point values refer to the mean load and price in the top
5% of hours with highest load.
35Recall that we include Austria and Luxembourg. Data from Statistisches Bundesamt (2016) and Eurostat
(2016).
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(2014) (see table 2.2). For both nodes we obtain a very good fit for marginal cost with a
simple polynomial having only a quadratic term (mc(g) = c · g2). The coefficients for the
quadratic term are cN = 0.0904321 and cS = 0.0209779 for North and South, respectively.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Equilibria
We first look at how an increase of wind infeed impacts on the type of the equilibrium. Fig-
ure 2.3 relates the two parameters, wind infeed and transmission capacity, to the type of
equilibrium. It has been drawn for the peak load scenario, but the results are very similar in
the mean load scenario. In the blank area towards the northwest, we have combinations of
low wind infeed and high capacity. In this area we find unconstrained Cournot equilibria in
pure strategies, i.e. an integrated market with the same price in both regions. Towards the
south-east we have combinations of high wind infeed and low capacity. Here we find trans-
mission constrained pure strategy equilibria for which the market is fragmented and prices
in the node North are lower than in the node South. Finally, the dashed area stretching from
south-west towards north-east represents those combinations of parameters for which only
equilibria in mixed strategies exist. The solidly drawn upper limit is the minimum capacity
to support an integrated market. The dashed line gives the maximum capacity for which a
passive-aggressive equilibrium with a fragmented market can be supported.36
If we assume a transmission capacity of 16 GW, for wind infeed ranging from zero to 35
GW37 and increase wind infeed gradually, we hit the regime switch from an integrated market
to the intermediate range at approximately 10.5 GW. When wind generation reaches approx-
imately 20.5 GW a unique passive-aggressive equilibrium emerges. Given the rapid growth
of installed capacity of wind-turbines in Germany, the likelihood of wind infeed to be in the
critical range from 10.5 to 20.5 GW has increased from 11.1% in the years 2013/14 up to
26.2% in the years 2015/16 (see appendix B.1 for the corresponding distribution functions).
For the mean load scenario the two threshold values are slightly higher, 11.9 GW, and 21.6
GW respectively.
36One might note that for any level of wind infeed the optimal unconstrained flow of power is in the dashed
area, between the minimum capacity for an integrated and the maximal capacity for a fragmented market.
37Fraunhofer ISE (2016) reports record of hourly wind production of 35.6 GW on 21 December 2015.
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Figure 2.3: Type of equlibrium depending on transmission capacity and wind infeed in the
network
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In the intermediate range, there exist no equilibrium in pure strategies. We approximate the
equilibrium in mixed strategies using a recursive numerical method adopted from Borenstein
et al. (1998) (see appendix B.2 for a brief description). In a nutshell: we represent a mixed
strategy by a set of fifty pure strategies, each played with probability 0.02. Given the mixed
strategy of her opponent, in each round a player adds a new pure best response to this set
and deletes the pure strategy for which expected profit is lowest. The process terminates
when the differences between the expected profits for the pure strategies within each set are
sufficiently small. In our case this process converged fast and reliably, independently of the
starting values.
Our numerical approximation of the mixed strategy equilibrium reveals a clear pattern (for
an illustration see figure 2.4). The player in the North randomizes in a small interval which
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Figure 2.4: Probability density functions (PDFs) in mixed strategy equilibria
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includes the unconstrained pure strategy best response. As wind infeed is increased, the
support of mixed equilibrium distribution is shifted downward almost one to one. In figure
2.4 we display the equilibrium probability distributions for an infeed of 13 GW in the first
row and 19 GW in the second. As infeed is increased by 6 GW conventional generation
in the North (left panels) is shifted from values around 20 GW down to values around 14
GW. As a result, expected total generation in the North changes very little. The player in
the South (right panels), in contrast, essentially randomizes between her unconstrained pure
strategy best response 33.4 GW and the optimal passive output 36.7 GW. Her strategy has
two distinct peaks separated by a range played with zero probability. Initially, at an infeed
close to the threshold of 10.5 GW the equilibrium strategy puts little probability on the optimal
passive output and most of the probability on the unconstrained best response. As wind
infeed increases, probability is continuously shifted towards the optimal passive output, which
becomes gradually dominant before it receives probability one at 20.5 GW. Hence in terms
of expected outcomes (quantities, prices etc.), we can expect a gradual change, instead of a
sudden jump as is suggested by figure 2.2.
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2.4.2 Consumption, prices and welfare
Now we look at how wind infeed and the resulting regime switches affect quantities, prices,
and ultimately welfare in the power market. As before we focus on the case of a transmission
capacity of 16 GW and peak demand. Throughout we discuss the results using charts.
Tables with numerical values and robustness checks for other transmission capacities can
be found in appendix B.3.
Consumption & Prices
Figure 2.5: (Expected) generation and consumption
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conv. generation (S)
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Figure 2.5 illustrates the effect of increasing wind infeed on power consumption and power
generation. The upper solid black line shows total generation which is equal to total con-
sumption. The light grey and dark grey dashed lines display how much of total consumption
takes place in South and North, respectively. The solid light grey and dark grey lines indicate
the power generation from conventionals owned by the two strategic players in South and
North, respectively. They do not add up to total generation as wind infeed, which happens
only in the North, is excluded.
Consider first the range where the market is integrated (from 0 to 10.5 GW). Here, total gen-
eration increases as wind generation is ramped up while conventional generation declines.
Since the merit order curves are different in each node, the decline is uneven: conventional
generation in the North falls from 23.89 GW to 22.46 GW, in the South — from 39.42 GW to
36.67 GW. In this process costly conventional generation is substituted by cheap RES power.
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At the same time consumption, equal total generation, increases, as production from con-
ventional generators decreases less than wind infeed increases. As a result, total generation
increases over this range from 63.31 GW to 69.63 GW.
However, the picture changes as we move beyond 10.5 GW into the intermediate range (in
between the dashed vertical lines). In this range players select quantities only with probabili-
ties. As we move to the right, quantities which are close to the passive-aggressive equilibrium
are played with increasing probabilities in equilibrium. On average an increase in wind infeed
is overcompensated by the reduction from conventional production. As a result, expected
total consumption declines from its peak of 69.63 GW to 66.39 GW at a wind infeed of 20.5
GW, where the passive-aggressive equilibrium becomes unique.
Once in the region of a fragmented market, the South is effectively insulated against any
further increase of wind infeed. Local generation and consumption stay constant at 33.35
GW and 49.35 GW, respectively. Additional wind infeed impacts only on the Northern market
where consumption increases from 17.04 GW to 25.3 GW at 35 GW of wind infeed, while
conventional generation declines from 12.27 GW to, eventually, zero. It is worth noting that,
starting from 10.5 GW wind infeed in an integrated market, it takes an additional 15 GW addi-
tional wind power before the same level total consumption is reached again in the fragmented
market.
Figure 2.6: (Expected) nodal prices
North
South .
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Figure 2.6 displays the corresponding development of nodal prices. In the integrated market,
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these are equal in both regions and decrease from 80.93 e/MWh to 73.18 e/MWh as wind
infeed climbs from zero to 10.5. In the intermediate range this trend is reversed. Expected
prices increase and spread out. When market fragmentation is firmly established at 20.5
GW, the price in the North has increased to 75 e/MWh, while the price in the South reached
77.88 e/MWh. Any further increase of wind generation will sharply depress prices in the
North while the southern price will remain constant.
Welfare
As usual welfare is measured by the difference between total gross consumer surplus and
total generation cost. It is, however, instructive to decompose it into the components: net
consumer surplus in North and South, profits from conventional generation in North and
South, profit from wind infeed, and congestion rent. In principle, welfare should increase as
conventional generation is replaced by wind based generation, because fuel cost is saved.38
However, the impact on market power is non-monotonic and has the potential to offset these
gains.
Given the previous results on quantities and prices the effect on net consumer surplus is
straightforward (figure 2.7). Initially, wind infeed enhances competition and net consumer
surplus in North and South increase. When the regime switches to the intermediate region,
however, the trend is reversed and consumer surplus in both regions declines. Once the
division of the market is firmly established, consumer surplus remains constant in the South
and strongly increases in the North. Total consumer surplus has a local peak at 2.97 million
euro per hour when we switch from an integrated market to the intermediate range. Then it
drops by app. 10 % down to 2.70 million euro per hour from where it raises again. Most of
the decline in the intermediate range takes place in the southern region, while the recovery
for very high infeed of wind power is confined to the northern region.
Finally, figure 2.8 presents the generators’ profits and the congestion rent. The profits of the
generators have been calculated assuming that they sell all their output at their respective
node. Whenever nodal prices differ, there is a congestion rent: the gains from buying at
the cheap node and selling at the expensive one. Under the standard nodal pricing scheme
this rent would be reaped by the transmission system operator to cover the cost of network
capacity.
38It is worth recalling that we take generation capacities as given. Hence, we ignore capacity cost and consider
variable cost only. It is beyond the scope of this paper to account for the full cost of the technologies, which would
require to consider reliability issues and the environmental impact as well.
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Figure 2.7: (Expected) net consumer surplus
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While the market is integrated, increased wind infeed reduces the profits of both conven-
tional generators. Once we move into the intermediate range, where the market starts to
disintegrate, the profits of the generator in the South are protected from further decline. It
is only the producer in the North which suffers from additional competition of wind power
infeed. In contrast, the profit of wind power producers is non-monotonic. In the integrated
and intermediate range it increases: the effect from growing sales outweighs the effect from
declining price. It reaches its peak of 1.57 million euro per hour at an infeed of 23 GW. As we
move further the price effects becomes dominant and the profit declines. It is worth recalling
that we ignore any RES energy support schemes (feed-in tariffs or market premiums) in this
calculation.
Taken together net consumer surplus, profits and congestion rent yield social welfare. It is
not plotted in the figures, but it can be found in the tables of appendix B.3. For the first 10.5
GW of wind power infeed, welfare increases strongly by 0.64 million euro per hour from 6.74
to 7.38 million euro. As we move into the intermediate range the increase flattens off to
reach a small local peak with 7.51 at app. 19 GW. Here, the negative impact on wind infeed
on competition is slightly stronger the fuel cost savings. After a small drop, welfare increases
again in the fragmented market.39
39Whether the anti competitive effect is even stronger than the cost saving effect depends critically on trans-
mission capacities. For our calibration, it happens for a capacity of 16 and 12 GW, but not for 8 GW.
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Figure 2.8: (Expected) profits and congestion rent
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2.5 Discussion
In this paper we have explained how an increase of local power production, such as wind,
may result in a less competitive overall market when transmission constraints grant strategic
players, e.g. conventional producers, regional market power. Using data on German de-
mand, generation capacities, and transmission constraints we calibrated a simple model and
demonstrated that this anti-competitive effect of wind infeed is not only a theoretical possi-
bility. It can happen over a wide range of relevant wind infeed40 and has the potential to
substantially affect prices, quantities, and consumer surplus. However, there is a number of
important limitations. First, we consider a simple two node system with only one transmission
constraint which is operated under nodal pricing. In reality Germany is operated as one price
zone with redispatch. Occasionally, it also faces additional transmission constraints within
the regions. Second, we ignore imports and exports. Finally, with four large companies oper-
ating the conventional generating capacity, the German market is more competitive than we
assume in our model.
Accounting for more transmission constraints is likely to increase the scope for the abuse
of market power. So does zonal pricing with redispatch. Strategic players will understand
that whenever transmission constraints become binding the system operator will eventually
40See the distribution functions for wind infeed in years 2013/14 and 2015/16 in the appendix B.1.
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depend on generation at a particular location for redispatch. At that stage, however, market
power in the deficit region is enhanced as local consumption is already fixed at a price which
is too low. Trade with additional regions, in contrast, will tend to weaken the effect, unless
transmission constraints bind in a correlated pattern.
The analysis of a market with more than two strategic players is left to future research. Intu-
itively, the equilibrium of the integrated market will be more competitive with a larger number
of players. As this equilibrium brakes down, whenever a firm can obtain a higher profit by
reducing its output and creating local market which is protected from imports at the margin,
it will depend on the location of the generators whether the anticompetitive effects are en-
hanced or reduced. If a third firm is located in the North, the problem is aggravated, because
the equilibrium profits in the integrated market decline, while the profits of the Southern firm
in case of fragmentation remain the same. If a third firm is located in the South, however,
it appears likely that the range of wind infeed and transmission capacity, for which we can
expect an anti-competitive effect, will be reduced. Any firm withholding supply would share
the gains from of an increase of the local price with a local competitor, while facing the cost
in terms of lost sales alone. In this sense, our results should be read as a warning: in view
of limited transmission constraints it is important to maintain vigorous local competition of
conventional producers in potential deficit regions even if an increasing share of power is
produced from a competitive fringe of small producers of RES energy in the surplus region.
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Appendix B
Anticompetitive effects of RES infeed
in a transmission-constrained
network
B.1 Distribution of wind generation in Germany
The following figures B.1 and B.2 depict the probability density and cumulative distribution
functions of wind generation in Germany in 2013-2016, based on the data from Open Power
System Data (2017). We have aggregated years 2013-2014 and 2015-2016 due to their
similarities. Higher levels of wind generation became noticeably more likely in 2015-2016
compared to 2013-2014. In the same time period mean wind capacity factors increased from
Figure B.1: Probability density function of wind generation in Germany
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Figure B.2: Cumulative distribution function of wind generation in Germany
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17.5% to 20.8%, installed capacities - from 32.1 GW to 42.4 GW.
B.2 Mixed equilibrium approach
In chapter 2 we use the “fictious play” approach to search for the mixed equilibrium, adopted
from Borenstein et al. (1998). This approach allows us to construct for each player a mixed
strategy, i.e. a probability distribution over a set of pure strategies. Prior to the start of the
algorithm, we need to define several things.
First, there is an arbitrary starting point (gN0, gS0). Second, the algorithm is applied for a
predefined number of step, or iterations (for each starting point, we set it between 235 and
520). At each iteration, each player adds to her set of pure strategies one more output:
Step 1. Each player determines her pure strategy best response to the output produced
by opponent. Since at the starting point player generates only one level of output
with certainty, the new optimal generation levels are: gN1 = brN (1, gS0) and gS1 =
brS(1, gN0)
Step 2. Each player determines her best response, but now assuming that all of the op-
ponent’s outputs from the previous steps are played with equal probabilities as a
mixed strategy. Therefore the new optimal generation levels are the pure strategy
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best responses to the opponent’s mixed strategy: gN2 = brN ((0.5, 0.5), (gS0, gS1)) and
gS2 = brS((0.5, 0.5), (gN0, gN1))
The process is continued: each player assumes that her opponent’s previous generation lev-
els belong to a mixed strategy and are played with equal probability. Given this assumption,
new best responses are determined. If there is no interference, the number of pure strategies
in each player’s set increases by 1 with every step. This brings us to the third point - we set a
cap on the number of pure strategies in each player’s mixed strategy. The absence of a cap
would substantially increase the computation time and interfere with convergence in cases
when a starting point lies far away from the mixed equilibrium. In such a case the starting
profit is significantly different from the subsequent ones, resulting in a failure of the algorithm
to meet the convergence criteria (more on the convergence below). We set a cap on the
number of pure strategies allowed in a mixed strategy at 50.
As the algorithm proceeds, at each iteration each player assumes that her opponent’s previ-
ous generation levels belong to a mixed strategy and are played with equal probability. Given
this assumption, new best responses are determined. Once the cap on the size of the mixed
strategy is reached, predefined exclusion criteria removes the pure strategy with the lowest
profit from the set. Exclusion criteria calling for removal of the oldest best response was
considered but not adopted, as it resulted in a slower convergence.
Finally, we predefine a convergence criteria. In the mixed equilibria each pure strategy in
her set brings the player the same profit. Therefore the convergence to mixed equilibrium is
declared once the standard deviation of each players’ profits from the outputs in her set falls
below a predetermined threshold.41 Otherwise the process fails to converge and terminates
when the limit on the number of iterations is reached.
B.3 Equilibrium values in tables
The following tables B.1-B.9 provide numerical description of equilibria for a range of wind in-
feed values combined with tree levels of transmission capacity between the nodes North and
South. The line capacity is equal to 16 GW in tables B.1-B.3, to 12 GW in tables B.4-B.6, and
to 8 GW in tables B.7-B.9. Tables B.1, B.4 and B.7 report values of conventional generation,
line flow and consumption; tables B.2, B.5 and B.8 - nodal prices, costs of conventional gen-
41For each combination of line capacity and RES infeed we considered 11 starting points. Threshold for the
profits’ standard deviation was set at 0.5 for 8 starting points, and at 0.3 for 3 more starting points.
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eration and generators’ profits; and tables B.3, B.6 and B.9 - congestion rent, net consumer
surplus and welfare. Te denotes thousand e.
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Table B.1: Hourly nodal generation and consumption
ATC between North and South is equal to 16 GW
RES conventional generation flow consumption
North North South N to S North South total
GW GW GW GW GW GW GW
integrated market
0 23.89 39.42 8.07 15.83 47.48 63.31
1 23.76 39.16 8.78 15.98 47.94 63.92
2 23.62 38.9 9.49 16.13 48.39 64.52
3 23.49 38.64 10.21 16.28 48.85 65.13
4 23.35 38.38 10.92 16.43 49.3 65.73
4.8 23.25 38.17 11.49 16.55 49.66 66.21
5 23.22 38.12 11.63 16.58 49.75 66.33
6 23.08 37.85 12.35 16.73 50.2 66.94
7 22.94 37.59 13.06 16.88 50.65 67.54
9 22.67 37.07 14.49 17.18 51.55 68.74
10 22.53 36.8 15.2 17.33 52. 69.33
10.5 22.46 36.67 15.55 17.41 52.22 69.63
intermediate range (expected values)
13 19.98 36.14 15.63 17.34 51.78 69.12
16 16.98 35.30 15.75 17.22 51.05 68.28
19 13.99 34.01 15.92 17.08 49.93 67.00
fragmented market
20.6 12.44 33.35 16 17.04 49.35 66.39
21 12.27 33.35 16 17.27 49.35 66.63
25 10.62 33.35 16 19.62 49.35 68.97
30 8.5 33.35 16 22.5 49.35 71.85
35 6.3 33.35 16 25.3 49.35 74.65
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Table B.2: Hourly prices, conventional generation costs and profits
ATC between North and South is equal to 16 GW
RES price costs profits
North North South North South wind North South
GW e/MWh e/MWh Te Te Te Te Te
integrated market
0 80.93 80.93 411 428 0 1523 2762
1 80.19 80.19 404 420 80 1501 2720
2 79.45 79.45 397 412 159 1479 2679
3 78.7 78.7 391 403 236 1458 2638
4 77.96 77.96 384 395 312 1437 2597
4.8 77.37 77.37 379 389 371 1420 2564
5 77.22 77.22 377 387 386 1416 2556
6 76.49 76.49 371 379 459 1395 2516
7 75.75 75.75 364 371 530 1374 2476
9 74.28 74.28 351 356 669 1333 2397
10 73.55 73.55 345 349 735 1312 2358
10.5 73.18 73.18 342 345 768 1302 2339
intermediate range (expected values)
13 73.50 73.91 240 331 956 1228 2338
16 74.08 75.10 148 309 1185 1110 2338
19 74.81 76.93 83 276 1421 964 2338
fragmented market
20.6 75. 77.88 58 259 1545 875 2338
21 73.84 77.88 56 259 1551 851 2338
25 62.32 77.88 36 259 1558 626 2338
30 48.21 77.88 18 259 1446 391 2338
35 34.48 77.88 8 259 1207 210 2338
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Table B.3: Hourly congestion rent, consumer surplus and welfare
ATC between North and South is equal to 16 GW
RES cong. rent net CS welfare
North North South total North South total
GW Te Te Te Te Te Te Te
integrated market
0 0 614 1843 2458 1484 5258 6742
1 0 626 1879 2505 1503 5303 6807
2 0 638 1915 2553 1522 5348 6870
3 0 650 1951 2601 1541 5392 6933
4 0 662 1987 2649 1560 5435 6995
4.8 0 672 2016 2689 1574 5470 7044
5 0 675 2024 2698 1578 5478 7056
6 0 687 2061 2747 1596 5521 7117
7 0 699 2098 2797 1614 5563 7177
9 0 724 2173 2897 1650 5646 7296
10 0 737 2211 2948 1667 5687 7354
10.5 0 743 2230 2973 1676 5707 7383
intermediate range (expected values)
13 7 738 2193 2931 1772 5687 7459
16 16 728 2132 2860 1856 5654 7510
19 34 715 2039 2755 1910 5602 7512
fragmented market
20.6 46 712 1991 2703 1932 5575 7507
21 65 732 1991 2723 1952 5575 7527
25 249 944 1991 2936 2131 5575 7707
30 475 1241 1991 3233 2308 5575 7883
35 694 1570 1991 3561 2434 5575 8010
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Table B.4: Hourly nodal generation and consumption
ATC between North and South is equal to 12 GW
RES conventional generation flow consumption
North North South N to S North South total
GW GW GW GW GW GW GW
integrated market
0 23.89 39.42 8.07 15.83 47.48 63.31
1 23.76 39.16 8.78 15.98 47.94 63.92
2 23.62 38.9 9.49 16.13 48.39 64.52
3 23.49 38.64 10.21 16.28 48.85 65.13
4 23.35 38.38 10.92 16.43 49.3 65.73
4.8 23.25 38.17 11.49 16.55 49.66 66.21
intermediate range (expected values)
6 22.13 38.00 11.58 16.55 49.58 66.13
10 18.12 36.78 11.73 16.39 48.52 64.91
13 15.13 35.66 11.88 16.24 47.54 63.78
fragmented market
15.1 13.04 34.74 12 16.14 46.74 62.89
16 12.68 34.74 12 16.68 46.74 63.42
17 12.27 34.74 12 17.27 46.74 64.02
18 11.86 34.74 12 17.86 46.74 64.61
19 11.45 34.74 12 18.45 46.74 65.2
20 11.04 34.74 12 19.04 46.74 65.78
20.6 10.79 34.74 12 19.39 46.74 66.13
21 10.62 34.74 12 19.62 46.74 66.37
25 8.93 34.74 12 21.93 46.74 68.67
30 6.74 34.74 12 24.74 46.74 71.49
35 4.48 34.74 12 27.48 46.74 74.22
70
Table B.5: Hourly prices, conventional generation costs and profits
ATC between North and South is equal to 12 GW
RES price costs profits
North North South North South wind North South
GW e/MWh e/MWh Te Te Te Te Te
integrated market
0 80.93 80.93 411 428 0 1523 2762
1 80.19 80.19 404 420 80 1501 2720
2 79.45 79.45 397 412 159 1479 2679
3 78.7 78.7 391 403 236 1458 2638
4 77.96 77.96 384 395 312 1437 2597
4.8 77.37 77.37 379 389 371 1420 2564
intermediate range (expected values)
6 77.38 77.51 327 384 464 1386 2560
10 78.17 79.24 180 350 782 1237 2561
13 78.90 80.84 104 319 1026 1089 2561
fragmented market
15.1 79.38 82.14 67 293 1199 969 2561
16 76.75 82.14 61 293 1228 912 2561
17 73.84 82.14 56 293 1255 851 2561
18 70.94 82.14 50 293 1277 791 2561
19 68.05 82.14 45 293 1293 734 2561
20 65.18 82.14 41 293 1304 679 2561
20.6 63.46 82.14 38 293 1307 647 2561
21 62.32 82.14 36 293 1309 626 2561
25 51.01 82.14 21 293 1275 434 2561
30 37.19 82.14 9 293 1116 242 2561
35 23.78 82.14 3 293 832 104 2561
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Table B.6: Hourly congestion rent, consumer surplus and welfare
ATC between North and South is equal to 12 GW
RES cong. rent net CS welfare
North North South total North South total
GW Te Te Te Te Te Te Te
integrated market
0 0 614 1843 2458 1484 5258 6742
1 0 626 1879 2505 1503 5303 6807
2 0 638 1915 2553 1522 5348 6870
3 0 650 1951 2601 1541 5392 6933
4 0 662 1987 2649 1560 5435 6995
4.8 0 672 2016 2689 1574 5470 7044
intermediate range (expected values)
6 2 672 2010 2682 1626 5468 7094
10 13 659 1926 2586 1761 5417 7178
13 23 647 1849 2496 1824 5371 7195
fragmented market
15.1 33 639 1787 2426 1854 5333 7187
16 65 682 1787 2469 1901 5333 7234
17 100 732 1787 2518 1952 5333 7285
18 134 783 1787 2569 2000 5333 7333
19 169 835 1787 2622 2046 5333 7379
20 204 889 1787 2676 2090 5333 7422
20.6 224 922 1787 2709 2115 5333 7448
21 238 944 1787 2731 2131 5333 7464
25 374 1179 1787 2966 2276 5333 7609
30 539 1502 1787 3288 2413 5333 7746
35 700 1852 1787 3639 2503 5333 7836
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Table B.7: Hourly nodal generation and consumption
ATC between North and South is equal to 8 GW
RES conventional generation flow consumption
North North South N to S North South total
GW GW GW GW GW GW GW
intermediate range (expected values)
0 23.27 39.5 7.57 15.71 47.06 62.77
5 18.26 38.04 7.75 15.51 45.79 61.30
9 14.26 36.31 7.98 15.29 44.28 59.57
fragmented market
10 13.49 36.12 8 15.49 44.12 59.61
10.5 13.29 36.12 8 15.79 44.12 59.91
11 13.08 36.12 8 16.08 44.12 60.2
12 12.68 36.12 8 16.68 44.12 60.8
13 12.27 36.12 8 17.27 44.12 61.39
14 11.86 36.12 8 17.86 44.12 61.98
15 11.45 36.12 8 18.45 44.12 62.57
15.1 11.41 36.12 8 18.51 44.12 62.63
16 11.04 36.12 8 19.04 44.12 63.16
17 10.62 36.12 8 19.62 44.12 63.74
18 10.2 36.12 8 20.2 44.12 64.32
19 9.78 36.12 8 20.78 44.12 64.9
20 9.36 36.12 8 21.36 44.12 65.48
20.6 9.1 36.12 8 21.7 44.12 65.82
21 8.93 36.12 8 21.93 44.12 66.05
25 7.19 36.12 8 24.19 44.12 68.31
30 4.94 36.12 8 26.94 44.12 71.06
35 2.6 36.12 8 29.6 44.12 73.72
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Table B.8: Hourly prices, conventional generation costs and profits
ATC between North and South is equal to 8 GW
RES price costs profits
North North South North South wind North South
GW e/MWh e/MWh Te Te Te Te Te
intermediate range (expected values)
0 81.52 81.62 380 431 0 1517 2792
5 82.49 83.70 184 387 412 1323 2792
9 83.59 86.16 87 335 752 1104 2792
fragmented market
10 82.61 86.43 74 330 826 1040 2792
10.5 81.14 86.43 71 330 852 1007 2792
11 79.67 86.43 68 330 876 975 2792
12 76.75 86.43 61 330 921 912 2792
13 73.84 86.43 56 330 960 851 2792
14 70.94 86.43 50 330 993 791 2792
15 68.05 86.43 45 330 1021 734 2792
15.1 67.76 86.43 45 330 1023 729 2792
16 65.18 86.43 41 330 1043 679 2792
17 62.32 86.43 36 330 1059 626 2792
18 59.47 86.43 32 330 1070 575 2792
19 56.63 86.43 28 330 1076 526 2792
20 53.81 86.43 25 330 1076 479 2792
20.6 52.13 86.43 23 330 1074 452 2792
21 51.01 86.43 21 330 1071 434 2792
25 39.93 86.43 11 330 998 276 2792
30 26.43 86.43 4 330 793 127 2792
35 13.37 86.43 1 330 468 34 2792
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Table B.9: Hourly congestion rent, consumer surplus and welfare
ATC between North and South is equal to 8 GW
RES cong. rent net CS welfare
North North South total North South total
GW Te Te Te Te Te Te Te
intermediate range (expected values)
0 1 605 1811 2417 1505 5221 6726
5 10 590 1716 2307 1686 5158 6844
9 21 573 1604 2177 1763 5084 6847
fragmented market
10 31 588 1592 2180 1794 5075 6869
10.5 42 611 1592 2203 1821 5075 6897
11 54 635 1592 2226 1849 5075 6924
12 77 682 1592 2274 1901 5075 6977
13 101 732 1592 2323 1952 5075 7027
14 124 783 1592 2374 2000 5075 7075
15 147 835 1592 2427 2046 5075 7121
15.1 149 841 1592 2432 2050 5075 7126
16 170 889 1592 2481 2090 5075 7165
17 193 944 1592 2536 2131 5075 7207
18 216 1001 1592 2593 2171 5075 7246
19 238 1059 1592 2651 2208 5075 7283
20 261 1119 1592 2710 2243 5075 7319
20.6 274 1155 1592 2747 2263 5075 7339
21 283 1179 1592 2771 2276 5075 7352
25 372 1435 1592 3026 2389 5075 7465
30 480 1780 1592 3371 2488 5075 7564
35 585 2149 1592 3741 2544 5075 7620
75

Chapter 3
Spacial vs. temporal balancing:
effects of transmission expansion
and storage capacity on a European
power system
Abstract
Any power system that is facing the expansion of renewable energy, needs to be able to
deal with an increasing frequency of mismatch between demand for electricity and power
generation. Both transmission and storage can be used to balance intermittent renewable
output by shifting surplus generation to deficit regions or deficit times. In this paper I study to
what extent temporal balancing via storage can substitute spacial balancing via transmission
in the network with expanding renewable capacities. To do so, I apply a storage heuristic for
various combinations of renewable capacity and energy capacity of storage under different
transmission constraints. This allows me to compare several system indicators – renewable
penetration, curtailment rates, and the minimum conventional back-up requirements. For the
storage capacity limited by 2.6 TWh, or the sum of existing pumped storage capacity plus
realizable potential for pumped storage, each indicator demonstrates a relatively modest
effect of temporal balancing. In contrast, transmission expansion has a significant potential
in mitigating curtailment rates, increasing the penetration of renewables and reducing the
need for conventional back-up.
Keywords: renewable energy, energy transition, electricity transmission, power storage
77
3.1 Introduction
Decarbonization, envisioned by European Union, goes hand in hand with an increasing re-
liance on renewable energy sources. In 2016 renewables, including hydro, accounted to just
29.6% of electricity generation in EU-28 (European Commission, 2018c). For 2030, the bind-
ing target share of at least 27% of renewable energy in final energy consumption translates
into at least 49% of renewables in electricity generation (European Commission, 2014c).42
Since no substantial growth of hydro power is expected (Lehner et al., 2005; Becker et al.,
2014), the key role in this expansion will be played by such renewable energy sources (RES)
as wind and solar.
The expansion of intermittent RES energy increases the frequency of mismatch between
demand and generation. Power system needs to be able to deal with both insufficient and
surplus RES output. A solution could be a combination of conventional back-up capacities
and some form of balancing - be it spacial or temporal. Balancing via expansion of either
network or storage enables surplus RES generation to be shifted to regions (or times) with
unfavourable weather conditions. As a result there is less curtailment in the network, and
the need for conventional back-up is reduced. The exact optimal combination of these three
options depends on a multitude of assumptions about the power system and is a subject
of abundant research literature. In this paper I refrain from determining an optimum, and
instead focus on the trade-offs related to the expansion of RES power. My research question
concerns the extent of substitution between transmission and storage. To investigate it, I
use a simple storage heuristic for various combinations of installed RES capacity and en-
ergy capacity of storage and compare several system indicators under different transmission
constraints.
The paper proceeds in the following way. Section 3.2 presents the literature review. Next,
in section 3.3, I describe the methodology and data used. In the next sections I present the
results of storage heuristic and compare the effects of temporal balancing with storage and
spacial balancing with transmission on such system characteristics as curtailment rates, RES
penetration and conventional back-up requirements. Section 3.7 discusses limitations of
presented analysis, including possible biases due to the assumptions made. Finally, section
3.8 concludes.
42The binding final energy consumption target has recently been updated from at least 27% of renewable
energy to at least 32% (European Union, 2018; European Commission, 2018a).
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3.2 Literature review
RES expansion stresses the need to address the challenge of intermittent energy supply.
While storage can be used to shift surplus RES generation in time, with transmission ex-
pansion RES output is aggregated over the larger the area, resulting in smoother generation
profiles (Bremen, 2010; Fraunhofer IWES, 2015). This effect of reduced variability leads
to lower requirements on conventional back-up power (Becker et al., 2014; Hagspiel et al.,
2017; Schaber et al., 2012).
Research literature, that incorporates transmission and storage in the task of RES integra-
tion, is abundant and has been a subject of several reviews (Haas et al., 2017; Zerrahn
and Schill, 2017; Cebulla et al., 2018). Often these studies look for an optimal system con-
figuration. Although optimal storage requirements tend to be moderate when RES energy
accounts for up to 50-70% of power supply (Zerrahn and Schill, 2017), they still depend on
assumptions made. For example, an optimization problem can specify the investment costs
in power plants and storage, fuel cost for conventional generators, price for CO2 certificates,
efficiency of power plants and storage facilities, etc. The resulting optimal storage require-
ments can vary a lot. Consider a review by Cebulla et al. (2018), that summarizes results of
over 400 scenarios from 17 studies (all but one with optimization) on storage expansion. For
a given share of RES in generation mix of each geographical region – Europe, Germany or
U.S. – optimal storage requirements differ widely: for example, for 40% RES in generation
mix in Europe estimates for optimal storage lie between 25 and 500 GWh. For Germany
the dependence of optimum on model assumptions can be illustrated by the debate around
the feasibility of RES expansion. The study by Sinn (2017) estimates that for Germany to
reach the target of 50% RES in electricity consumption it would require storage with 2.1 TWh
of energy capacity – or construction of more than 1900 extra pumped storage plants. But
Sinn (2017) does not allow for any curtailment of RES. Zerrahn et al. (2018) remove this
assumption and arrive at an estimate of only 35 GWh of storage – less than existing 38 GWh
of pumped storage – required to reach the same RES target.
Assumptions in the optimization problem matter for its solution, but in a fixed set of as-
sumptions spacial balancing with transmission tends to behave as a substitute to temporal
balancing through storage (Fu¨rsch et al., 2013; Cebulla et al., 2018). The explanation lies
in the generation mix. In networks with limited transmission optimal generation mix has
more PV power built close to demand locations, as opposed to expanded, wind-oriented
networks (Schlachtberger et al., 2017; Ho¨rsch and Brown, 2017). Since PV output is more
geographically correlated, PV-dominated mixes require larger storage than wind-dominated
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ones (Cebulla et al., 2018). Once artificial limits on the network are removed, and trans-
mission expansion is possible, preference for it over storage can be traced back to model
parameters, as grid expansion is usually cheaper than storage (Cebulla et al., 2018). But
cost assumptions on transmission are subject to frequent and justified criticism: transmis-
sion lines are slow projects, vulnerable to social objection and taking 5–10 years on average
to complete (Heard et al., 2017). It is not entirely clear to what degree the relationship be-
tween transmission and storage in the optimum, that can be found in the literature, is driven
by cost assumptions.
Hence it is reasonable to study the substitution between transmission and storage without
performing an optimization. Such analysis can offer additional insights into the functioning of
possible future network configurations.
3.3 Methodology and data
Under favourable weather conditions the expansion of RES capacities can lead to RES gen-
eration exceeding immediate consumption. Instead of being curtailed, this surplus output
can be stored. There are several ways to model storage operation. One is to optimize charg-
ing and discharging of storage to ensure better integration of RES surpluses. Uncertainty
of future RES supply can be considered, although usually the literature uses a deterministic
approach (Haas et al., 2017). In contrast to this optimization approach, in this paper I use
a myopic storage heuristic. Any current RES output exceeding load is stored as long as
the storage capacity permits and is curtailed otherwise. Once residual load – the difference
between load and RES generation – is positive, energy is released from storage, displacing
conventional generation.43 The level of power in storage is equal to zero at the beginning of
the year and can be positive at the end.
This paper applies myopic storage heuristic to the European network of 19 countries. In-
cluded are Germany, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech republic, Denmark, Spain, Fin-
land, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Swe-
den, Slovenia and Slovakia. As a shorthand, further on in this paper they are referred to as
“Europe”. While the aim was to cover as many countries as possible, the choice set was
ultimately limited by data availability. To apply the storage heuristic for this (or any) region I
need to set values of two parameters - RES capacity and energy capacity of storage. The
first determines the volume of surplus RES output produced in the system, the second - the
43Examples of both myopic and optimally sheduled storage can be found in Zerrahn et al. (2018)
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ability of the system to shift consumption of surplus RES in time. Both variable parameters
enter the myopic storage heuristic at total European levels. They are then distributed among
countries according to electricity demand: countries with high demand are assumed to have
more installed RES and larger volume of storage. Each country is represented as a single
node. To study the effect of cross border transmission I consider two cases. The first one
assumes that there is no cross border trade, and each country has to perform the storage
heuristic on its own. In the second case markets in the network are fully integrated, with
cross border lines able to accommodate whatever flows necessary, and the storage heuristic
is implemented for the whole region. Further in this paper these two cases are referred to as
autarky and copper plate, respectively.
Now let’s consider the parameters of storage heuristic in more detail. Installed RES is the
first of them. To apply the myopic storage heuristic, I need to determine the volume of sur-
plus RES output produced in the system. To calculate it I combine historical load data from
ENTSO-E (2018a) with RES generation. To get the latter, I use the results of reanalysis
done by Staffell and Pfenninger (2016c) and Pfenninger and Staffell (2016), available online
as a database44. They provide hourly historical capacity factors for on- and offshore wind
and PV for the EU-28 plus Norway and Switzerland, based on NASA’s MERRA-2 dataset.45
Therefore to get RES generation I need to choose a year, that will give me load and weather
patterns, and to make an assumption on the level of RES generation installed. In the follow-
ing sections most of the results refer to the year 2014, with additional calculations provided
for 2012-2014. In this paper I consider a range of installed RES capacities. As a starting
point, in 2016 there was 242.3 GW of installed wind and PV in the studied countries (Euro-
pean Commission, 2018c; ENTSO-E, 2018b). To scale up RES capacities I need to make an
assumption on how they are distributed between technologies – onshore, offshore wind and
PV – within each country. For this purpose I use weights based on the analysis by Fraunhofer
IWES (2015), performed on behalf of Agora Energiewende. They study the flexibility require-
ments arising from the 2030 target of about 50% of RES in the power supply. In particular,
they assume that by 2030 the sum of wind onshore, wind offshore and PV in the studied
countries will increase more than twofold, up to 522 GW. Capacity levels for different tech-
44Renewables.ninja (2018), https://www.renewables.ninja/downloads, see also Staffell and Pfenninger
(2016b) and Staffell and Pfenninger (2016a).
45Staffell and Pfenninger (2016c) provide several versions of wind capacity factors. I use the one based on
what they call “near-term” future wind fleet (current wind fleet plus under construction or with planning approval
as of December 2016, see Renewables.ninja (2018)). Renewables.ninja (2018) provides two PV capacity fac-
tors datasets, based on two different meteorological sources: NASA’s MERRA-2 and Meteosat-based CM-SAF
SARAH satellite. However, Pfenninger and Staffell (2016) state that MEERA-2 version is more consistent on a
long-term basis, therefore I use it.
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nologies in Fraunhofer IWES (2015) come from national grid development plans and national
energy strategy documents (for Austria, Germany, France and partially the Netherlands), and
from the “green transition” vision of ENTSO-E (2014) for the rest.46
The second variable parameter in the storage heuristic is the energy capacity of storage.
I scale up the energy capacity of storage to demonstrate what effects it can have on the
network. While power capacity refers to the instantaneous electricity flow, the energy ca-
pacity of storage deals with power integrated over time. Essentially, this is the volume of
storage. Since in the future we would like to use storage to shift surplus RES generation
form periods with favourable weather conditions to prolonged periods of lull and dark hours,
the energy capacity of storage will be the binding constraint. Currently, energy capacity of
pumped storage in Europe is no more than 327 GWh (Sinn, 2017; European Commission,
2016). In this paper I set the upper limit on the range of possible storage volume values at 2.6
TWh. This is approximately equal to the sum of existing pumped storage capacity plus 2291
GWh of realizable potential for pumped storage in EU-15, Switzerland and Norway (van de
Vegte, 2015).47 This number is also comparable to 3 TWh of maximum estimates for the op-
timal energy capacity of storage needed in Europe under different scenarios (Cebulla et al.,
2018).48
Given the values of two variable parameters – RES capacity and energy capacity of storage
– the storage heuristic produces an output in form of a time series of conventional dispatch
and RES curtailment. Finally, using this output, I calculate several indicators. The first is
the curtailment rate - curtailed RES generation divided by total RES generation. It estimates
the percentage of the RES generation that is ultimately wasted - i.e., neither consumer nor
stored.49 The second system indicator is the share of consumed RES generation in the
total annual electricity demand, or RES penetration. It estimates the percentage of the load
that is covered with either simultaneous RES generation or with RES energy released from
storage.50 The third indicator is the maximum hourly mismatch between the load on one hand
46See table 6, page 81, in Fraunhofer IWES (2015).
47EU-15 in van de Vegte (2015) includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
48See Cebulla et al. (2018), excluding extreme outliers with high RES shares and CO2 certificate price of 400
e/t.
49Curtailment rate in copper plate is equal to the RES generation curtailed, assuming no transmission con-
straints between the countries, divided by the total RES generation. Curtailment rate in autarky is equal to the
sum of RES generation curtailed in each country, assuming no transmission between the countries, divided by
the total RES generation.
50Given installed RES capacity, the storage heuristic allows me to calculate the total conventional dispatch di-
vided by total load. The RES penetration is equal to one minus this fraction. In copper plate case, no transmission
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and RES generation and possible storage discharge on the other - the minimal conventional
capacity that should be installed to avoid a blackout. Appendix C.1 provides calculation
results for Germany, while appendix C.2 provides extra tables with calculation results.
3.4 Curtailment
Whatever the future combination of cross border transmission, storage and RES installed in
Europe will be, it will most likely result in some level of curtailment. Curtailment occurs when
there is a lack of demand or if the network constraints do not allow for all of the RES gen-
eration to be injected. As a result, some of the RES output is lost. This loss can be viewed
negatively, especially when curtailment is associated with financial costs, as it is the case
with curtailment as a result of feed-in management measures in Germany.51 Yet, in a sense,
curtailment is not a new phenomenon, as conventional power plants are limited by dispatch
decisions. For example, in 2018 the capacity factor of hard coal in Germany was 34.7% -
higher than 21.5% for wind but still far from 100%.52 Nevertheless, RES curtailment is differ-
ent in that RES energy comes at a zero marginal cost, making storage a potentially attractive
alternative to wasting this energy. But to what extent should the storage be deployed? Should
a power system try to avoid curtailment altogether? After all, European policies focus on the
consumption of RES energy, and for the same level of installed RES capacity lower levels of
curtailment translate into higher RES penetration.
In this section I present curtailment rates, calculated for the storage policy described in the
previous section, assuming that there is no congestion within each country. Figure 3.1 plots
iso curves for the possible combinations of installed RES capacity and storage capacity for
the fully integrated network (figure 3.1 (a)) and autarky case (figure 3.1 (b)) in Europe. The
almost vertical character of iso curves suggests that the temporal effect of storage on cur-
tailment rate is far less than the effect of spatial balancing. The latter can be observed in the
horisontal comparison of figures 3.1 (a) and (b): given the level of storage capacity, curtail-
ment rates are lower in the fully integrated network for the same levels of installed RES. For
example, 1000 GW installed RES will result in less than 10% curtailment with no transmission
constraints compared to 10-20% in autarky.
constraints are assumed in the heuristic. In autarky case, there is no transmission between countries.
51According to Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2017b), curtailment rate of 2.3% in 2016 lead to an
estimated 373me o compensation to RES operators under the German legal framework.
52Own calculations based on Fraunhofer ISE (2018) data.
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Figure 3.1: Iso curves of European curtailment rates (%), depending on storage and installed
capacity of RES
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Figure 3.2: RES curtailment rates (%), depending on the energy capacity of storage
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Intuition suggests that the more storage capacity is added, the lower the curtailment is, given
the same level of installed RES. This hypothesis is explored in figures 3.2 (a) and (b). Figure
3.2 (a) plots curtailment rate in copper plate and autarky at 500 GW RES installed. This
is almost twice as high as RES capacities installed in 2016 and close to what Fraunhofer
IWES (2015) proposed for 2030. For the weather pattern of 2014 it gives an annual RES
generation of 992 TWh, or 35% of total electricity demand of 2829 TWh in the same year.
At this “low” (compared to figure 3.2 (b)) level of installed capacity curtailment in the fully
integrated network is non-existent for any storage level considered. If there is any surplus
RES in one region, it is simply transferred to and consumed in deficit regions. There is no
spacial balancing in autarky, and curtailment is at 1.6% without storage, falling to 0.3% at
2600 GWh storage capacity. Figure 3.2 (b) plots curtailment rate at 1500 GW installed RES.
For the weather pattern of 2014 this level of installed RES leads to 2977 TWh of annual RES
generation. Nevertheless, even with 2600 GWh of storage capacity curtailment is 24.7% in
autarky and 12.3% in the fully integrated network, falling from 32% and 18.2% respectivelly
at zero storage. At first this may look counter-intuitive, as annual RES generation is only 5%
larger than the annual electricity demand. However, although RES displays smoothing effect
over large areas, outputs in neighbouring countries are correlated (Fraunhofer IWES, 2015).
Coinciding peaks of RES infeed fill the storage up to its capacity. As a result, for 2302 hours
(26% of the year) the storage capacity constraint is binding. Binding storage constraint, in
turn, leads to curtailment, that can be mitigated by network expansion.
Figures 3.3 (a) and (b) further illustrate the dependence of curtailment rate on installed RES
capacity. Initially, when installed RES capacities are relatively low, so are the surplus RES
generation and curtailment rates. In contrast, at high levels of installed RES a large part of
RES output is neither consumed nor stored, leading to high curtailment rates. Although there
is no storage in figure 3.3 (a), as opposed to 2600 GWh of storage capacity in figure 3.3 (b),
the curtailment does not change dramatically between these two figures. In both plots, inde-
pendently of transmission in the network, curtailment rate is close to zero for installed RES
doubled from 2016 levels (about 500 GW) and converges to approximately the same levels
for high values of installed RES. Even though in the fully integrated network RES energy is
consumed more efficiently due to spatial balancing, eventually surplus RES generation is too
large in relation to the storage capacity, and the greater part of RES output is curtailed.
In the future, past 2030, one can expect installed RES to lie between those two extremes.
In this case, on one hand, a large part of the electricity demand is satisfied by RES output,
and on the other - curtailment is not extremely high. It is in this middle range of installed
RES that both storage capacity and cross border transmission can have noticeable effect
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Figure 3.3: RES curtailment rates (%), depending on installed capacity of RES
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Figure 3.4: Difference in curtailment rates, depending on installed capacity of RES
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on curtailment. Figures 3.4 (a) and (b) aim to separate the temporal effect of storage and
the spacial balancing effect of transmission in figures 3.3 (a) and (b). The temporal effect of
storage is plotted in figure 3.4 (a). At its peak, in autarky an increase in storage capacity from
zero GWh to 2600 GWh reduces the curtailment rate by 7.4 percentage points, from 32% to
24.7%. In the fully integrated network curtailment is already lower due to spacial balancing,
hence extra storage capacity leads to a reduction of 5.9 percentage points, from 18.2% to
12.3%. Spacial balancing, plotted in figure 3.4 (b), has a greater magnitude compared to the
temporal one. Switching from none to unlimited transmission in the network at zero GWh
storage capacity reduces curtailment rate by 14.5 percentage points, from 26.3% to 11.8%.
At 2600 GWh storage capacity the reduction is 13 percentage points, from 19.2%, to 6.2%.
The less storage there is, the greater the spacial balancing effect.
Of course, it is possible to completely eliminate curtailment if the energy capacity of storage is
large enough to store the full volume of surplus RES generation. However, it may not only be
economically unreasonable, as shown by Zerrahn et al. (2018), but also not feasible as stor-
age volume will fast soar beyond the European pumped storage potential (Sinn, 2017). The
higher the RES penetration that we would like to have in Europe, the more RES needs to be
installed, the more persistent curtailment will be. As this section demonstrates, curtailment
can be mitigated by temporal balancing, but to a lesser extent than by spacial balancing. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to answer to what extent curtailment will affect the investment
incentives of market participants. As a possible solution, RES generators can provide energy
in other markets, apart from electricity. Using electricity, for example, in heating or transport
sectors, can reduce curtailment and give extra profits for RES generators. At the same time,
such sector coupling will change load patterns, increase overall demand for electricity, and
consequently negatively affect the achievement of any possible RES penetration targets.
3.5 RES penetration targets
European policy targets focus on how much RES energy is consumed in the network (Eu-
ropean Council, 2014). For 2030 the binding target of at least 27% of RES in final energy
consumption corresponds to at least 49% of RES in electricity generation (European Com-
mission, 2014c). In this section I discuss the substitution between storage and transmission
expansion in the context of their effects on RES penetration - the share of electricity demand
covered with either simultaneous RES generation or with RES energy released from storage.
Note that in this paper I only focus on wind and PV power. Due to the lack of data I do not
estimate the hydro power output, that would normally be added to RES statistics. Since in
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2016 hydro power accounted for 11.5% of total electricity generation53, and given that no
substantial growth of it is expected, my estimates for the RES penetration are approximately
10% lower than those that would account for hydro power.
3.5.1 RES target achievement without storage
Consider a country striving to achieve a certain level of RES penetration. Although achieving
such target is easier with storage, assume for a moment that there is none. The network has
a trade off between expanding either installed RES capacity or cross border transmission.
Table 3.1 presents the installed RES capacity, required to reach different levels of RES pene-
tration in 19 European countries. The calculations are done for the fully integrated European
network (CP rows) and two versions of European autarky. In rows Auti each country has to
achieve the target. In rows Aute, like in Auti, there are no flows between the countries, but
now only the total European target on RES penetration matters.
The most important result is that the capacity requirement is not only higher in both versions
of autarky, but the gap between autarky and the fully integrated network increases dramati-
cally for the higher RES penetration.
Consider the penetration levels of 20% and 50%. To reach a goal of 20% RES in electricity
demand, in the fully integrated network we need 285 GW RES installed, which is 18% more
than 242.3 GW installed in 2016. The same extra capacity is needed in case of autarky with
target achievement on European level (Aute). In a more demanding case when each country
needs to achieve the target in autarky (Auti) we need 314 GW installed - 30% more than
there was in 2016, or 10% more than in the fully integrated network. The 50% target is even
harder to achieve without cross border flows. In the fully integrated network it requires 714
GW RES installed. In the mild version of autarky (Aute) we need 10% more RES, or 786 GW
installed; in the more demanding version of autarky (Auti) - 868 GW installed, or 22% more
than in the fully integrated network. Choosing a different year (or years) for analysis does not
change the results a lot. The bottom half of the table 3.1 shows results for the 2012-2014
load and weather patterns. Here the extra installed RES, required to reach the target in each
country in autarky, as opposed to the fully integrated network, goes up from 9% (311 GW vs.
285 GW) to 20% (859 GW vs. 715 GW). The gap goes well beyond 250% more for the 90%
target.
53See European Commission (2018c), pages 91 and 121.
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Table 3.1: RES penetration (r, in %) and system characteristics
r 0. 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99
RES installed, GW. 2014 data
Auti 0 157 314 473 649 868 1178 1654 2504 4755 263448
Aute 0 143 285 431 592 786 1043 1426 2111 3975 31579
CP 0 143 285 428 570 714 867 1046 1287 1699 3071
RES curtailed, %. 2014 data
Auti 0 0. 0. 1.2 5.1 12. 22.5 36.1 52.5 72.5 99.5
Aute 0 0. 0. 0.7 3.6 9.3 18. 30. 46. 67.7 95.5
CP 0 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.2 1.3 4.6 11.4 24.5 54.
RES installed, GW. 2012-2014 data
Auti 0 156 311 469 642 859 1167 1644 2498 4718 176091
Aute 0 143 286 431 590 782 1036 1415 2098 3937 31675
CP 0 143 285 428 571 715 869 1050 1291 1694 3028
RES curtailed, %. 2012-2014 data
Auti 0 0. 0. 1.2 4.9 11.7 22.1 35.8 52.4 72.3 99.2
Aute 0 0. 0. 0.7 3.6 9.2 17.8 29.7 45.7 67.4 95.5
CP 0 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.2 1.3 4.7 11.5 24.3 53.4
These results demonstrate the spacial balancing effect on RES target achievement. For the
same level of RES installed, unlimited transmission capacities enable the network to reach
higher RES targets. More over, this effect becomes more prominent at higher targets. As
shown in section 3.4, spacial balancing reduces the need to curtail RES due to the ab-
sence of network constraints. As less power is curtailed, a larger part of RES generation
is consumed for the same level of installed capacity. The balancing effect of transmission
underlines the importance of cross border connections. If Europe plans to press for higher
RES energy targets, the choice has to be made between expanding national RES capacities
and expanding cross border lines. The next subsection investigates if storage expansion can
change this conclusion and substitute network expansion.
3.5.2 RES target achievement with storage
Assume that some expandable storage technology is available. With storage, a country
needs less installed RES to reach the same target of RES penetration. As storage capacity
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is expanded, less RES power needs to be curtailed, and for the same level of installed RES
capacity more surplus RES power is stored, to be released into the network as soon as the
residual load is positive. Let’s look at the substitution between cross border transmission and
storage for a given level of installed RES capacity.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 plot the iso curves for the trade-off between installed RES capacity and
storage capacity in a fully integrated network (figure 3.6) and an autarky case (figure 3.5)
in Europe. Each curve shows all the possible combinations of European values for storage
and installed RES capacity that result in a certain level of RES penetration. Both figures are
based on 2014 load and weather data. The values along horizontal axes in figure 3.5 (3.6)
correspond to the row Aute (CP ) in table 3.1. Each of these figures can be interpreted as
a feasible region of an optimization problem: to reach a certain target at a minimal cost the
iso curves would have to be complemented by a negatively sloping budget constraint, with a
tangent point indicating solution.
Both figures demonstrate that storage does not have a noticeable effect for a wide range of
installed RES. Even at 1000 GW - approximately fourfold increase of current RES capacities
and doubled of what is proposed for 2030 by Fraunhofer IWES (2015) - iso curves are verti-
cal. There is not enough surplus RES generated for the temporal balancing to be detectable.
Spacial balancing too relies on surplus RES output, but, as seen in table 3.1, it already has
a prominent effect on target achievement at around 1000 GW RES installed.
How does temporal balancing compare against spacial one in general? To what extent can
storage substitute the network expansion? Figure 3.7 aims to separate the temporal effect
of storage and the spacial balancing effect of transmission in figures 3.6 and 3.5. It depicts
the difference in RES penetration between the fully integrated network and the autarky case
for zero and 2600 GWh storage capacity. I.e., it shows the potential to improve the RES
penetration by expanding either network or storage.
For relatively “low” levels of installed RES all four combinations of transmission and storage
in the network lead to indistinguishable outcomes. This range includes 242.3 GW RES in-
stalled in 2016 that result in 17% of RES penetration independently of both transmission and
storage capacities. From about 500 GW RES installed there is enough surplus RES in the
network for both spacial and temporal balancing to have an effect on RES penetration. In
particular, spacial balancing starts to play a prominent role. With no constraints on cross
border transmission, previously curtailed power is now consumed in deficit regions and is
accounted for in RES penetration. At its peak spacial balancing helps to increase the pen-
etration rate by 15.2 percentage points with no storage available and by 13.1 percentage
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Figure 3.5: Iso curves of RES penetration (%), depending on storage and installed capacity
of RES, autarky
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Figure 3.6: Iso curves of RES penetration (%), depending on storage and installed capacity
of RES, copper plate
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points with 2600 GWh storage. Before the peak, the additional effect from storage is small
compared to the spacial balancing: the gap between “no storage” and “2600 GWh storage
capacity” curves is about 2 percentage points. Once the peak of the spacial balancing is
reached, the effect of storage becomes larger with the gap between “no storage” and “2600
GWh storage capacity” increasing up to about 7 percentage points.
Consider the following example. If there are 1000 GW RES installed in the network, without
cross border trade RES penetration will be 58.5% with zero storage and 62.5% with 2600
GWh of storage. Expanding the network to the point there transmission constraints are no
longer binding will increase the RES penetration to 67.7% with zero storage and to 69.8%
with 2600 GWh of storage. In contrast, if there are 3000 GW RES installed in the network,
without cross border trade RES penetration will be 86.3% with zero storage and 95.3% with
2600 GWh of storage; while network expansion can increase the RES penetration to 98.8%
with zero storage and to 99.9% with 2600 GWh of storage. Additional calculations demon-
strate that the effect of spacial balancing on RES penetration, plotted in the figure 3.7, is
persistent to storage expansion. For 1350-1600 GW RES installed, network expansion will
still give 10 or more extra percentage points of RES penetration even if storage volume is
equal to 100 TWh.
These results demonstrate that the temporal balancing can hardly substitute the line expan-
sion in the task of increasing RES penetration. Cross border connections in the network are
important. Although increasing storage volume up to the full potential does have a positive
effect on the RES penetration, it is small compared to what network expansion can achieve.
3.5.3 RES expansion and storage
One should be warned against making a conclusion that near vertical slope of iso curves in
figures 3.5 and 3.6 means that storage has little to offer for the foreseeable future. In this
analysis each country is treated as a single node, i.e. no congestion is assumed to take place
within each country. This assumption does not hold in practice. For example, in Germany
on average 2.7% of RES generation had to be curtailed each year between 2015 and 2017,
because network capacities were not sufficient to transport the total amount of electricity
generated (Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt, 2017b, 2019). Non-zero curtailment
has also been observed in such European countries as Spain and Italy (Bird et al., 2016).
Therefore the results, reported in section 3.4, should be treated as a lower bound on future
curtailment rates in Europe.
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Figure 3.7: Difference in RES penetration between copper plate and autarky cases
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The results in sections 3.4 and 3.5 highlight the following: high RES penetration targets re-
quire high levels of installed RES capacity. However, electrical storage has, for the most part,
minor effect on required RES expansion. At the same time, RES expansion comes together
with high curtailment rates. As was already mentioned above in section 3.4, there is a poten-
tial for sector coupling - utilizing surplus RES energy in other markets, apart from electricity.
Sector coupling will reduce curtailment and change load patterns, potentially alleviating con-
gestion within countries. But sector coupling will also increase the demand for electricity.
This may be an important side effect for some states: for example German legislation sets
RES targets in terms of gross electricity consumption (the renewable energy sources act,
Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (2017)), and not in terms of final energy consumption as in
the European Union (European Union, 2018).
3.6 Conventional back-up
Any combination of RES installed and storage that does not result in a fully renewable system
would need some amount of conventional generation. The myopic storage heuristic is not
the best policy to address the issue of conventional back-up, as it disregards the future
fluctuations in RES output and does not aim to reduce peaks of residual load.
The need for conventional back-up can be measured in several ways. In terms of annual
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conventional generation, consider figures 3.5 and 3.6. If, for example, given the levels of RES
installed and storage capacity RES penetration is between 40% and 50%, the remaining 50%
to 60% of 2829 TWh of total electricity demand have to come from conventional back-up.
A more important indicator is the maximum hourly mismatch between the load on one hand
and RES generation and possible storage discharge on the other. This is the maximum
required conventional generation at any hour. It can also be interpreted as the minimal
conventional capacity that should be installed to avoid blackouts. Since demand and weather
patterns vary from year to year, any country concerned with security of energy supply will
install more conventional back-up than this minimum. For example, in 2014 Germany had
76.5 GW of wind and PV installed (Fraunhofer ISE, 2018), resulting in a maximum mismatch
of 76 GW. Nevertheless, installed conventional power amounted for 92.6 GW, with additional
5.6 GW provided by hydro power, and 6.9 GW - by biomass.
Two factors influence the maximum hourly mismatch between the load on one hand and
RES generation and possible storage discharge on the other. The first is the installed RES
capacity, the second is the storage capacity. The first creates peaks of RES generation in
the network, while the second creates the ability to shift those peaks in time. Figures 3.8
(a) and (b) plot the peak hourly need for conventional dispatch depending on the energy
capacity of storage. They demonstrate that the storage effect is quite moderate compared to
the importance of transmission.
In figure 3.8 (a) there are 1500 GW RES installed (about 6 times more than in 2016) that gen-
erate 2977 TWh annually, or 5% more than the total electricity demand of 2829 TWh in 2014.
In figure 3.8 (b) 3500 GW RES installed (about 14 times more than in 2016) generate 6947
TWh annually, or 146% more than the total electricity demand. In figure 3.8 (a) the maximum
hourly mismatch stays constant independent of storage capacity - there is not enough sur-
plus RES generated to address the prolonged time periods with RES-unfavourable weather
conditions. In figure 3.8 (b) this situation improves, and the full utilization of spacial balancing
together with 1700 GWh storage capacity bring the need for conventional back-up down to
zero.
Of course, building up high levels of installed RES capacities so as to reduce conventional
dispatch will have its cost. Consider curtailment: even with full utilization of spacial and
temporal balancing it stays above 12% for 1500 GW installed RES and above 59% for 3500
GW RES (see figures 3.9 (a) and (b)). If we would like to avoid conventional back-up and
associated fossil fuel use, huge amount of RES will have to be installed, and most of RES
output will be curtailed, raising questions about the incentives to install RES in the first place.
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Figure 3.8: Peak hourly need for conventional dispatch, GW
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Figure 3.9: RES curtailment rates, %
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3.7 Discussion
In this section I’d like to discuss limitations and biases of the study, presented above. First of
all, since this paper does not focus on a particular storage technology, no assumptions were
made on efficiency losses in charging and discharging.54 Hence the results overestimate
the effect of temporal balancing. As previous sections demonstrate, this bias does not help:
spacial balancing has a more prominent effect than storage on curtailment rates and RES
penetration.
Second, only the extreme cases of transmission usage are discussed: complete isolation
of autarky vs. absence of any transmission constraints in the fully integrated network. No
limited line expansion can outperform the latter, hence focus on the extreme cases does
capture the full extent of spacial balancing potential. However, I intentionally do not try to
answer a question of the optimal line expansion. Such attempt would require a wide range of
assumptions, for example on investment costs in power plants and storage facilities, fuel cost
for conventional generators, price for CO2 certificates, efficiency of power plants and storage
facilities, etc. The optimal expansion of transmission lines also depends on the granularity of
the model (Schlachtberger et al., 2017). The larger the scope of aggregation, the less nodes
per country are there, the more weight is given to traditionally weaker cross border lines. As
a consequence, models with only one node per country show bigger network expansions
compared to the models with multiple nodes per country. For example, for the same cost
of transmission expansion – 400 e/MWkm – one-node-per-country study by Schlachtberger
et al. (2017) determines the optimal grid, that leads to a 95% CO2 reduction compared to
1990 levels, to be nine times larger than the existing one, while a higher granularity study
by Ho¨rsch and Brown (2017) - only three times larger than the existing one.55 Hence in the
set-up, used in this paper, any attempt to find the required transmission expansion will result
in an upward biased estimate.
Finally, in this paper I look on the electricity sector only, and do not investigate possibilities for
coupling with other sectors. Electrical storage is more expensive compared to technologies
available in heating or transportation sectors (Lund et al., 2016), and sector coupling can
reduce the need for electrical storage (Zerrahn et al., 2018). At the same time, sector cou-
pling will create new demand for electricity, changing the consumption patterns and affecting
54For example, an overview of storage technologies including efficiency estimates can be found in Luo et al.
(2015).
55Both Schlachtberger et al. (2017) and Ho¨rsch and Brown (2017) measure the grid in TWkm.
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Europe’s ability to achieve targets on renewable energy in electricity consumption.
3.8 Conclusion
Wind and solar renewable energy is inherently intermittent. Hence their expansion inevitably
forces a network to address possible mismatch between demand and generation. Spacial
balancing through transmission expansion and temporal balancing through storage are often
suggested as possible solutions. There is an extensive literature, dedicated to determining
an optimal configuration and characteristics of power system under certain assumptions, in
particular, provided a certain share of renewable energy. Although it is good to know what
the first best is, extending analysis to the non-optimal states is a reasonable idea, especially
since the transmission expansion projects can take several years to complete.
In this paper I presented outcomes of implementing a myopic storage heuristic in a network
of 19 European countries for different combinations of transmission capacity and storage en-
ergy capacity. In particular, I have focused on three indicators: share of renewable energy
in electricity demand, rate of renewable energy curtailed, and the minimum conventional
generation required at any hour. Results contrast the spacial balancing and the temporal
balancing, demonstrating that the former outweights the latter in the analysed range of stor-
age capacities of up to 2.6 TWh, or the sum of existing pumped storage capacity and the
realizable potential for pumped storage in EU 15, Switzerland and Norway. Spacial balanc-
ing through transmission expansion creates the possibility for European countries to reach
renewable targets much faster compared to the absence of cross border trade; while tempo-
ral balancing has little effect on achievement of targets. Spacial balancing can also reduce
the curtailment rates in the network to a larger extent compared to the temporal balancing.
Finally, for the minimum conventional generation required at any hour, it is the spacial bal-
ancing that enables the network to completely forgo the conventional power, but only at the
cost of high curtailment rates.
Repeatedly the calculations demonstrate the importance of spacial balancing of renewable
power. Storage alone does not allow the network to reach penetration levels realizable with
line expansion. If Europe is to continue on the journey to the high targets of renewable
generation in electricity consumption, the only way to avoid the expansion of cross border
lines is extremely high installed renewable and storage energy capacities.
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Appendix C
Spacial vs. temporal balancing:
effects of transmission expansion
and storage capacity on a European
power system
C.1 RES target achievement in Germany alone
This appendix presents the results of myopic storage in German power system. Load and
weather data are taken from 2014, making it possible to compare the results to the study on
the limits of Germany’s energy revolution by Sinn (2017).
Table C.1 presents the RES capacities, required to be installed in Germany to reach different
RES targets, together with associated curtailment and maximum hourly residual load – the
difference between load on one hand and RES generation and possible storage discharge
on the other. Results are calculated given the existing 38 GWh of pumped storage capacity
(Sinn, 2017). For the reference, the German renewable energy sources act (Erneuerbare
Energien Gesetz, 2017) sets the target on RES energy in gross electricity consumption at
40-45% by 2025 and at 55-60 % by 2035. To achieve the 60 % target, existing, as of 2018,
105.4 GW of installed RES (Fraunhofer ISE, 2018) would need to be more than doubled up
to 215 GW. Curtailment increases from zero at the existing level of installed RES, to 9.1%
at RES penetration equal to 60%, but stays below 30% for RES penetration levels of up to
80%.
As in Sinn (2017), table C.1 and figures C.1 and C.2 assume absence of internal bottlenecks
in the German grid, i.e. a copper plate. Hence the curtailment results, reported in this
appendix, should be treated as a lower bound on the actual curtailment rates. I will come
back to this point below.
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Table C.1: Characteristics of German power system at different RES penetration levels. 2014
data, 38 GWh storage capacity
RES RES RES maximum
penetration (%) installed (GW) curtailed (%) residual load (GW)
0 0 0 80
10 33 0. 78
20 65 0. 77
30 98 0. 75
40 132 1. 74
50 170 3.9 73
60 215 9.1 73
70 274 16.7 72
80 362 28. 71
90 567 48.3 69
99 1819 82.3 57
Figure C.1 plots the iso curves for the trade-off between installed capacity and storage in
Germany based on 2014 data. Each curve shows all the possible combinations of storage
and installed RES capacity that result in a certain level of RES penetration. The black dot A
corresponds to the position of Germany in 2018: 105.4 GW of installed RES (Fraunhofer ISE,
2018) and 38 GWh of pumped storage capacity (Sinn, 2017). The white dot B corresponds
to the storage capacity, required, according to Sinn (2017), to reach 50% RES penetration
level.56
Again, figure C.1 assumes the absence of transmission constraints within the German grid.
In reality, the German grid does have internal bottlenecks.
The impact of those bottlenecks can be tracked through the monitoring reports of the fed-
eral network agency (Bundesnetzagentur). Feed-in management, or curtailment of RES
infeed in cases when network capacities were not sufficient to transport the total amount of
electricity generated, has increased dramatically since 2010 (Bundesnetzagentur and Bun-
deskartellamt, 2019). In 2015, 2016 and 2017 curtailed energy amounted to 4.7 TWh, 3.7
TWh and 5.5 TWh (or 2.9%, 2.3% and 2.9% of RES installations eligible for payments under
56Sinn (2017), table 1. Note that Sinn (2017) does not report the exact level of installed RES, but the penetration
level and the required storage capacity.
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Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (2017)).57 Moreover, in Germany curtailment of RES energy
has a financial dimension to it, as the operators of RES installations have to be compensated
(Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (2017), paragraph 15).58 Therefore one should be warned
against making a conclusion that the near vertical slope of iso curves in figure C.1 means
that storage has little to offer for the foreseeable future. Storage provides means to avoid
wasting the energy that would otherwise be curtailed. Hence it has ability to address prob-
lems related to network congestion. However, the question remains as to who would build
up storage capacities. Since currently operators of RES installations are compensated in the
event of curtailment, they do not have incentives to make such investments.
Avoiding curtailment by means of storage brings us to the second point. Figure C.1 can be
compared to tables 1 and 2 in the study by Sinn (2017) on the the limits of German En-
ergiewende. In his calculations, Sinn (2017) excludes the possibility of curtailment - apart
from a 25% “round-trip” efficiency loss, all surplus RES energy has to be stored in pumped
storage. In table 1 Sinn (2017) provides estimated energy capacity of storage, required in
Germany given a certain level of RES penetration. In table 2 Sinn (2017) expands his es-
timations to cases there fluctuations in German RES supply are balanced, as much as it
is possible, by conventional plants and hydro dams in neighbouring countries with no con-
straints on transmission capacity. As in chapter 3 of this thesis, the calculations in Sinn
(2017) rely on 2014 data.59 Remember, the upper limit of the vertical axis in figure C.1 is 2.6
TWh, which is approximately equal to the sum of existing pumped storage capacity in Europe
plus 2291 GWh of realizable potential for pumped storage in EU-15, Switzerland and Norway
(van de Vegte, 2015).60 The estimates of required storage in the study by Sinn (2017) are
extremely high. According to them, just for Germany alone, the required storage capacity ex-
ceeds the 2.6 TWh limit for RES penetration levels above 52.5% (if Germany is isolated from
its neighbours) or above 67.6% (if Norway, Austria, Switzerland and Denmark help Germany
to balance fluctuations of its RES generation).
57See Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2017a), Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2017b),
Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2019).
58Curtailment of 4.7 TWh, 3.7 TWh and 5.5 TWh (or 2.9%, 2.3% and 2.9% of RES installations eligible for
payments under Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (2017)) in, accordingly, 2015, 2016 and 2017 (Bundesnetza-
gentur and Bundeskartellamt (2019), page 141) corresponds to estimated 478me, 373me and 609.9me in
compensations (Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt, 2017a,b, 2019).
59The main difference in data is that while Sinn (2017) takes actual RES generation data from TSO’s, I use
estimates of capacity factors from Renewables.ninja (2018).
60EU-15 in van de Vegte (2015) includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
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Figure C.1: Iso curves of RES penetration (%), depending on storage and installed capacity
of RES, Germany
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Figure C.2: Iso curves of RES curtailment (%), depending on storage and installed capacity
of RES, Germany
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High capacities of installed RES will lead to high curtailment rates, as table C.1 and figure C.2
show. At the same time, electrical storage of all RES surpluses at high RES penetration is, as
demonstrated by Sinn (2017), not feasible (at least in terms of expansion of pumped storage).
In the German network with limited transmission capacities high RES penetration will lead
to high curtailment and high compensation payments, while elimination of compensation
payments can reduce incentives to expand RES capacities. The existing legal framework in
Germany will have to change to create incentives to utilize surplus RES energy, for example,
by removing obstacles for the economic potential of power-to-heat (Romero, 2018).
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C.2 Power system characteristics
Tables C.2-C.5 present output of myopic storage heuristic for combinations of installed RES
and storage capacities. Tables C.2 and C.3 list RES penetration levels, while tables C.4 and
C.5 list curtailment rates. There are no cross-border flows in tables C.2 and C.4, while in
tables C.3 and C.5 there are no transmission constraints. All four tables are based on 2014
load and weather patterns.
Table C.2: RES penetration (%), autarky
RES storage capacity, GWh
GW 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000 3300
250. 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5
312.5 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9
375. 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3
437.5 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7
500. 34.7 34.8 34.8 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 35. 35. 35. 35.
562.5 38.6 38.7 38.8 38.9 39. 39. 39. 39.1 39.1 39.1 39.2
625. 42.3 42.4 42.6 42.7 42.8 42.9 42.9 43. 43. 43.1 43.1
687.5 45.7 46. 46.2 46.3 46.4 46.5 46.6 46.7 46.8 46.8 46.9
750. 49. 49.3 49.6 49.8 49.9 50.1 50.2 50.3 50.4 50.4 50.5
812.5 52. 52.4 52.7 53. 53.2 53.3 53.5 53.6 53.7 53.8 53.9
875. 54.8 55.3 55.7 56. 56.2 56.4 56.5 56.7 56.9 57. 57.1
937.5 57.3 58. 58.4 58.8 59. 59.3 59.5 59.6 59.8 60. 60.1
1000. 59.7 60.5 61. 61.4 61.7 62. 62.2 62.4 62.6 62.8 62.9
1062.5 61.9 62.8 63.4 63.8 64.2 64.5 64.8 65. 65.2 65.4 65.6
1125. 64. 64.9 65.6 66.1 66.5 66.9 67.2 67.5 67.7 67.9 68.1
1187.5 65.8 66.9 67.6 68.2 68.7 69.1 69.4 69.7 70. 70.2 70.5
1250. 67.6 68.7 69.5 70.2 70.7 71.2 71.5 71.9 72.2 72.4 72.7
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Table C.3: RES penetration (%), copper plate
RES storage capacity, GWh
GW 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000 3300
250. 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5
312.5 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9
375. 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3
437.5 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7
500. 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1
562.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5
625. 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8
687.5 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2
750. 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6
812.5 56.8 56.9 57. 57. 57. 57. 57. 57. 57. 57. 57.
875. 61. 61.1 61.2 61.3 61.3 61.3 61.4 61.4 61.4 61.4 61.4
937.5 64.9 65.2 65.4 65.5 65.5 65.6 65.6 65.7 65.7 65.7 65.8
1000. 68.6 68.9 69.2 69.3 69.5 69.6 69.7 69.8 69.9 69.9 70.
1062.5 71.9 72.4 72.7 72.9 73.1 73.3 73.4 73.5 73.6 73.8 73.8
1125. 75. 75.6 75.9 76.2 76.4 76.6 76.8 77. 77.2 77.3 77.4
1187.5 77.8 78.6 79. 79.3 79.6 79.8 80. 80.2 80.4 80.6 80.7
1250. 80.4 81.3 81.8 82.2 82.5 82.8 83. 83.2 83.4 83.6 83.7
Table C.4: RES curtailed (%), autarky
RES storage capacity, GWh
GW 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000 3300
250. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
312.5 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
375. 0.1 0.1 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
437.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 0.
500. 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
562.5 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 1. 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7
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RES storage capacity, GWh
GW 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000 3300
625. 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6
687.5 5.2 4.6 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.1 3. 2.9 2.7
750. 6.9 6.2 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.
812.5 8.8 8. 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.4 6.2 6. 5.8 5.6 5.4
875. 10.8 9.9 9.3 8.8 8.5 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.4 7.1 6.9
937.5 12.8 11.8 11.2 10.6 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9. 8.8 8.6
1000. 14.8 13.8 13. 12.5 12. 11.6 11.3 11. 10.7 10.5 10.3
1062.5 16.9 15.8 15. 14.3 13.8 13.4 13.1 12.7 12.5 12.2 12.
1125. 19. 17.8 16.9 16.2 15.7 15.2 14.8 14.5 14.2 13.9 13.7
1187.5 21. 19.7 18.8 18.1 17.5 17. 16.6 16.3 15.9 15.7 15.4
1250. 22.9 21.7 20.7 19.9 19.3 18.8 18.4 18. 17.7 17.4 17.1
Table C.5: RES curtailed (%), copper plate
RES storage capacity, GWh
GW 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000 3300
250. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
312.5 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
375. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
437.5 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
500. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
562.5 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
625. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
687.5 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
750. 0.1 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
812.5 0.3 0.1 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
875. 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
937.5 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0. 0.
1000. 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
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RES storage capacity, GWh
GW 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000 3300
1062.5 3.5 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1. 0.9
1125. 4.9 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9
1187.5 6.6 5.7 5.2 4.8 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.1
1250. 8.3 7.3 6.7 6.3 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.5
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Appendix D
Technical Documentation
An interested reader can find the files on the CD accompanying the thesis.
D.1 Transmission capacities and competition in Western Euro-
pean electricity market
Chapter 1 is published in Spiridonova (2016). The computations in this chapter has been
done in GAMS, building on the code and data from Gabriel and Leuthold (2010). The code
itself is not published.
The mathematical formulation of the model, taken from Gabriel and Leuthold (2010), can
be found in section 1.3. Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) consider only one strategic player and
solve a corresponding mathematical program with equilibrium constraint (MPEC). I assume
that the number of strategic players is larger than one and solve a system of MPECs, or
an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). The solution EPEC is found by
diagonalization (see Gabriel et al. (2013), chapter 7), described in section 1.3.
Model results were exported in .txt lists, that were imported in Mathematica code written by
prof. Franz Hubert to produce maps in figures 1.1-1.5 in chapter 1.
D.2 Anticompetitive effects of RES infeed in a transmission-
constrained network
The description on the methodology can be found in section 2.2 and appendix B.2.
The following subsections present the description of code files.
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D.2.1 Marginal cost functions
To obtain marginal costs, we constructed a merit order curve for each node combining the
information on conventional installed capacities in Germany, Austria and Luxembourg ob-
tained via Open Power System Data (2016) and marginal costs estimations based on Egerer
et al. (2014). The file conventional power plants.sqlite was downloaded from Open Power
System Data (2016), https://data.open-power-system-data.org/conventional_power_
plants/2016-10-27.
Next, the code contained in conventional power plants by fuelnode.txt was applied to
conventional power plants.sqlite in in the DB Browser for SQLite. The data on conven-
tional power plant was grouped by nodes and by fuel type used into a table “fuelsandnodes”,
marginal costs estimations for each fuel type were added based on Egerer et al. (2014). This
information is presented in the table 2.2.
The SQLite table “fuelsandnodes” was exported into a separate file conven-
tional power plants fuelsandnodes.csv and read into Mathematica notebook DE-Data-
to-Parameters.nb. For both nodes - North and South - we have obtained a very good fit for
marginal cost with a simple polynomial having only a quadratic term (mc(g) = c · g2). The
coefficients for the quadratic term are cN = 0.0904321 and cS = 0.0209779 for nodes North
and South, respectively.
D.2.2 Demand calibration: reference points
We consider two reference points: mean and peak. In 2014 mean load was 66.2 GW, mean
price - 32.8 e/MWh; peak load 86.2 GW, peak price - 52.9 e/MWh. For the peak demand
scenario hourly loads in 2014 in the price zone of Germany, Austria and Luxembourg were
sorted from highest to lowest. The peak reference point values refer to the mean load and
price in the top 5% of hours with highest load. Load data comes from ENTSO-E (2018a),
price data - form EEX. We do not have a permission to publish the EEX data set.
D.2.3 Demand calibration: inverse demand functions
Apart from estimating marginal cost functions, the Mathematica notebook DE-Data-to-
Parameters.nb calculates intercept and slope parameters of linear inverse demand func-
120
tions, passing through corresponding reference points. Next we decompose parameters for
the whole market (Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg) into nodal parameters (nodes North
and South). Since load is assumed to be distributed according to regional GDP, nodal de-
mand intercepts are equal, while demand slopes are inversely proportional to the regional
GDP shares. Resulting parameters are presented in table 2.1.
Nodal intercept and slope parameters of linear inverse demand functions and marginal cost
coefficients are exported in files DE-Parameters-Mean-Demand and DE-Parameters-Peak-
Demand.
D.2.4 Pure strategy equilibria
The Mathematica files Pure-Strategy-EQ.nb and Pure-Strategy-EQ.m provide the defini-
tions of functions, that describe both best response functions and profits from producing best
response. These functions are used in the search for the pure strategy equilibria given the
parameter values.
The Mathematica notebook PURE-working-space.nb reads in Pure-Strategy-EQ.m and ei-
ther DE-Parameters-Mean-Demand or DE-Parameters-Peak-Demand, to produce a table
tableGenerationPureEQpeak.txt (tableGenerationPureEQmean.txt) containing equilibria
type and equilibrium nodal outputs for a range of wind infeed and line capacities.
D.2.5 Mixed strategy equilibria
Mathematica notebook MIXED-working-space looks for mixed equilibria in the model, using
approach described in Section B.2. This files uses:
1. Pure-Strategy-EQ.m,
2. DE-Parameters-Peak-Demand or DE-Parameters-Mean-Demand for the calibration
of marginal costs,
3. MIXED-DE-demand-peak-calibration.m or MIXED-DE-demand-mean-
calibration.m for the calibration of demand parameters,
4. finally, MIXED-strategy.m defines the algorithm used to find mixed equilibria (see ap-
pendix B.2).
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Once the files listed above are read in, MIXED-working-space looks for a mixed equi-
librium for a set of starting points and produces an output file (example: resultsOfFold-
ings k16 w13 peak.txt, where the number after k indicates transmission capacity of the line,
and the number after w - wind infeed, and peak refers to the demand scenario). The output
files list mixed equilibria values for: output strategies of Northern player, output strategies of
Southern player, profits of Northern player, profits of Southern player.
D.2.6 Analysis of pure and mixed strategy equilibria
The Mathematica notebook DE-evaluation-of-EQ.nb reads in files with both functions and
parameters, for example for the peak calibration:
1. Pure-Strategy-EQ.m,
2. MIXED-DE-demand-peak-calibration.m,
3. tableGenerationPureEQpeak.txt,
4. mixed equilibria outputs for a certain level of line capacity (for example, resultsOf-
Foldings k16 w13 peak.txt, resultsOfFoldings k16 w16 peak.txt, resultsOfFold-
ings k16 w19 peak.txt)
Once the files are read in, DE-evaluation-of-EQ.nb produces graphical outputs, presented
in Section 2.4.2, mixed equilibria histograms in figure 2.4, and tables, presented in appendix
B.3.
D.2.7 Wind generation in Germany, 2013-2016
Finally, probability density and cumulative distribution functions of wind genera-
tion in Germany in 2013-2016 in appendix B.1 are based on the data set
time series 60min singleindex filtered.csv, downloaded from Open Power System Data
(2017), https://data.open-power-system-data.org/time_series/2017-07-09, filtered
by region DE and by start date 2010-01-01. The calculations and plots have been performed
in the Mathematica notebook wind Density.nb.
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D.3 Spacial vs. temporal balancing: effects of transmission ex-
pansion and storage capacity on a European power system
The analysis have been performed within the Mathematica notebook analy-
sis myopic storage.nb. The methodology is described in section 3.3. The data
used:
1. Capacity factors were taken from the reanalysis studies by
Staffell and Pfenninger (2016c) and Pfenninger and Staffell
(2016). Files ninja wind europe v1.1 future nearterm national.csv,
ninja wind europe v1.1 current national.csv, ninja wind europe v1.1 future nearterm on-
offshore.csv, and ninja pv europe v1.1 merra2.csv were downloaded (all in ver-
sions v1.1) at Renewables.ninja (2018). This data is not published, but can be down-
loaded by an interested reader from Renewables.ninja (2018). The only manual data
manipulation, done outside of Mathematica notebook analysis myopic storage.nb,
was the removal from the original .csv files of all the entries apart from those for the
years 2012-2014;
2. Load data, recorded in ENTSOE coreEU+ 12-14.dsf, was downloaded from ENTSO-E
(2018a). It was then refined by Domenico Schneider and Franz Hubert at the Chair for
Management Science at Humboldt University of Berlin, with files DataFormat.m and
DataDocu.m providing documentation. In the data set 4 entries (2 hours in year 2012,
1 hour 2013, and 1 hours in 2014) of Spanish load are missing and are replaced with
average of load an hour before and after;
3. To be able to scale up installed renewable capacity, I assume that in the future the
distribution of installed renewables within each country between different technologies
– onshore, offshore wind and PV – will follow the structure in Fraunhofer IWES (2015),
table 6, page 81. These capacity levels come from national grid development plans
and national energy strategy documents (for Austria, Germany, France and partially
the Netherlands), and from the “green transition” vision of ENTSO-E (2014) for the
rest.
For my analysis, I need the capacity factors for wind offshore, onshore and solar generation in
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia
and Slovakia.
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For PV, Pfenninger and Staffell (2016) provide two capacity factors datasets, based on two
different meteorological sources: NASA’s MERRA-2 and Meteosat-based CM-SAF SARAH.
However, Pfenninger and Staffell (2016) state that MEERA-2 version is more consistent on a
long-term basis. Hence I use this data, recorded in ninja pv europe v1.1 merra2.csv.
For wind, Staffell and Pfenninger (2016c) provide “near-term” future capacity fac-
tors for on- and offshore wind in ninja wind europe v1.1 future nearterm on-
offshore.csv, where “near-term” future wind fleet refers to current wind fleet
(operating wind fleet as of December 2016) plus under construction or with
planning approval as of December 2016 (see Readme file at Renewables.ninja
(2018)). File ninja wind europe v1.1 future nearterm national.csv provides na-
tional “near-term” future capacity factors for wind, without on-/offshore division. Since
ninja wind europe v1.1 future nearterm on-offshore.csv file does not cover all wind
types (on- and ofshore) for all of the 19 considered countries, additional assumptions have
been made:
1. For land locked countries, offshore wind capacities factors are set to zero (Austria,
Switzerland, Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia);
2. Onshore wind capacity factors for Switzerland, Czech repub-
lic, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia are missing both
from ninja wind europe v1.1 future nearterm on-offshore.csv and
ninja wind europe v1.1 future nearterm national.csv, hence I take them from
ninja wind europe v1.1 current national.csv - a national wind capacity factor data
set based on “current” wind fleet characteristics (operating wind fleet as of December
2016, see Readme file at Renewables.ninja (2018));
3. Denmark has only offshore wind capacity factors in
ninja wind europe v1.1 future nearterm on-offshore.csv, hence I set its on-
shore wind capacity factors equal to its national wind capacity factors from
ninja wind europe v1.1 future nearterm national.csv;
4. Fraunhofer IWES (2015) lists future wind offshore capacity in Spain and Portugal as
equal to zero. Hence offshore wind capacity factors in there countries are set to zero.
Days with time change (summer to winter time, winter to summer time) were removed from
analysis.
Taking the data, described above, the Mathematica notebook analysis myopic storage.nb
performs two types of calculations (“chapters” within the file analysis myopic storage.nb).
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The first step assumes no storage in the network, and looks for installed RES capacity (in
GW) required to reach certain RES penetration targets (see subsection 3.5.1 and appendix
and C.1). The second step assumes a myopic storage heuristic, described in described in
section 3.3. Any current RES output exceeding load is stored as long as the storage capac-
ity permits and is curtailed otherwise. Once residual load – the difference between load and
RES generation – is positive, energy is released from storage, displacing conventional gener-
ation. The myopic storage heuristic takes an installed RES capacity and a storage capacity
and provides an output in form of a time series of conventional dispatch, RES curtailment
and energy stored (i.e., hourly storage levels). These time series are then used to calculate
system characteristics, reported in chapter 3 and appendix C.2.
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